Public housing, population redistribution, and urban development in Singapore by Hsu, Charlene C.
PUBLIC HOUSING, POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION,
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN SINGAPORE
by
Charlene C . Hsu
B. A., University of Texas at Austin, 1982
a Master's Thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Geography
Kansas State University
Manhattan, Kansas
198^4-
Approved by ^£j*^
Lb A11202 itiaoo
rri
lit*
t. %
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
There are many people I would like to thank for helping
me make it through all the hard time and frustrations during
my work on this thesis. My advisor, Dr. "Sy" Seyler, deserves
special appreciation. Without his patience, guidance, and
encouragement, the thesis might still be far away from being
done. I am greatful to my parents, especially for their
unfailing financial support, which allow me to begin and
complete this Master's program. I also like to thank the
faculty and staff of the Department of Geography of Kansas
State University, for they have given me the most joyable
and memorable school-year in my life. And finally, I want
to say "Thank you" to all my friends and my family in Taiwan,
and friends in Austin, Texas and Manhattan, Kansas for your
kindnesses and friendships. You have made my life beautiful.
And I love you all!
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables iii
List of Figures iv
List of Maps v
Chapters
1
.
INTRODUCTION 1
Nature of the Study 5
Justification 6
Method of Approach 7
Expected Results 8
Terminology 8
Text Organization 10
2
.
LITERATURE REVIEW 11
Public Housing: The Hong Kong Case 14
Severe Housing Shortage in Hong Kong 15
Inception and Development of Public Housing
in Hong Kong 17
3
.
SINGAPORE ' S EXPERIENCE 25
The Housing Situation Before I960 27
The Singapore Improvement Trust, 1924-59 .... 29
The Housing and Development Board (HDB) 32
Organization and Functions 32
Programs and Achievements 34
Planning Guide and Development 41
Master Plan of 1955 (SMP) 41
The Concept Plan of Singapore (SCP) k2
Neighborhood Principle and New Town
Concept 49
Land Acquisition and Reclamation 53
Urban Renewal 55
Summary 61
4. HDB HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, IMPACTS, AND
POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION 63
Problems Encountered in the Study 63
Changes of Census Division Boundaries,
1970-80 68
Impacts of the Public Housing Development .... 70
Population Growth and HDB Housing
Development, 1957-70 71
Population Growth and HDB Housing
Development
, 1970-80 78
Economic and Social Impacts of HDB
Housing Development 86
Economic Impacts 86
Social Impacts 90
Problems of HDB Housing Development 96
Future of HDB Housing Development 98
5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF SINGAPORE'S
EXPERIENCE 100
Summary 100
Singapore
' s Unique Features 101
Singapore Contrasted With Hong Kong 105
Implications of Singapore's Experience 107
BIBLIOGRAPHY 110
ii
LIST OF TABLES
1. The HDB Target. Completion, and Percentage of
Population Accommodated, 1960-85 31
2. Waiting List for Different Types of Flats,
Selected Years 39
3. New Town Development as of 31 March, 1983 52
k. Percent of Population Increase, 1957-70 and
1970-80, and Percent of Population Living in HDB
Housing, 1970 and 1980, by Census Division 72
LIST OF FIGURES
1 . The HDB Organization 33
2. New Applications to Rent and to Purchase
HDB Flats 37
LIST OF MAPS
1. Population Distribution in Singapore, 1970 3
2. Population Distribution in Singapore, 1980 4
3. Location of Public Housing Estates in Hong Kong .. 19
k. Map Series of the Implementation of the
Concept Plan 43
5. Future Land-Use Pattern of the Concept Plan
of Singapore 4?
6. Urban Renewal Area in the Central Area of
Singapore 57
7. Census Division of Singapore, 1970 66
8. Census Division of Singapore, 1980 67
9
.
Population Growth in Singapore by-
Census Division, 1970-80 75
10
.
Location of HDB Development 76
11 Population Living in HDB Housing in
Singapore by Census Division, 1980 77
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
A properous country in Southeast Asia, the city-state
of Singapore had a total land area of 6l8 square kilometers,
and a total population of 2.^7 million in 1983. In March
of 1983, Singapore's sole government housing agency, the
Housing and Development Board (HDB) , announced that seventy-
five percent of the nation's population was living in public
housing, also known as HDB housing or HDB flats. An additional
127,000 applications for HDB flats were on a waiting list.
For a capitalist country, the share of the population
in public housing is unusually high. People residing in HDB
housing are there as a matter of free choice. The popularity
of HDB housing is apparent. Because of this popularity, Sin-
gapore's government is able to use its public housing program
to redistribute population, develop comprehensive land-use
planning, and, hence, reshape the social and economic land-
scape on the island.
As in many other countries, Singapore began its public
housing as a social welfare program in 1960./ It was designed
to rehouse people living in deteriorating, overcrowded, and
unsanitary squatter and slum areas. With the government's
financial support and HDB's ambitious effort, a severe housing
shortage was relieved within a decade. In late 1973 i the
government announced a plan to build middle-income housing,
with the objective of accommodating those middle-income families
which could not afford expensive private housing.
In 1964, the "Home Ownership for People Scheme" was
introduced. As part of a multi-facet initiative, HDB encouraged
and aided residents to purchase their flats. In 1968, a funding
mechanism was introduced as the Central Provident Fund (CPF)
,
the social security deposit, became a source of home purchasing
payments. As a consequence, by early 1983, 65.6 percent of
the residents owned their homes. (HDB 1982/83) (According to
a census report, 61.9 percent of the total population owned
their homes in 1980
.
)
Before I960, when the HDB began its large-scale public
housing project, the population in Singapore was highly
concentrated on the southeastern part of the island. The
housing development during the 1960s had somewhat spread the
population more outward, but most of people were still on the
southeastern portion of the island. (Map 1) During the 1970s,
the direction of housing development shifted toward outer parts
of the island, and several new towns were created outside of
the city boundary. The 1980 census showed the divisions out-
side of the city, where the large HDB housing estates were
located, all had a large population gain. Meanwhile, the city
area had lost 2.3 percent of its population from 1970 to 1980,
even though there was a sixteen percent increase nation-wide.
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It is therefore apparent, that HDB housing development not only
achieved the rehousing of Singapore's people, but also redis-
tributed the population. (Maps 1 and 2)
In 1971, with United Nations' assistance, the Concept
Plan of Singapore (SCP) was introduced. It is a comprehensive
development plan for the state as a whole. The plan emphasized
development of the island along an east-west corridor and a
ring around the water-catchment in the center of the island.
The whole island is divided into seven sections. Each section
includes residential areas, industrial, commercial, recreational,
and other uses. Each section is also connected by expressway
and public transportation. The plan would allow the island
to accommodate four to six million people. HDB ' s housing deve-
lopment is guided by the plan. This study focuses mainly on
the affects of HDB housing development on population redistri-
bution and changes in people's life between 1970 and 1980.
NATURE OF THE STUDY
Public housing in Singapore began as social welfare
program, namely to resolve a severe housing shortage. Over
two decades of development, the program has gained such
momentum that it not only has rehoused a majority of the
population into government housing, but also has restructured
the population distribution. This study examines how public
housing development has reshaped the distribution of the
population, and how such change has affected the people of
Singapore. Emphasis is placed on the period of 1970 to 1980.
Guided by a comprehensive plan, housing development in
Singapore has also changed the pattern of urban distribution.
From the early 1970s, the Concept Plan of Singapore has been
conceived as a mechanism for guiding the directions of housing
and urban development. Accordingly, this study will assess
the degree to which the Plan has permitted Singapore to reshape
its social and economic landscape in a planned manner.
JUSTIFICATION
Of the four traditions of geography discussed by William
Pattison, this study would fit into both the traditions of
spatial analysis and area studies. According to Pattison,
spatial analysis is, "... the act of separating from the happen-
ings of experience such aspects as distance, form, direction,
and position." (Pattison 1971) The main focus of this study
is the population redistribution through a government housing
program under the guidance of a comprehensive plan. In the
study, where and in which direction people have moved are
examined. The pattern of population growth in relation to
housing development is studied.
The study also fits into the area studies tradition because
it promotes a better understanding of a place, a nation. With
such an understanding, one can compare and differentiate other
places or nations with respect to their housing development
and/or urbanization process. Also, by knowing why and how the
public housing project succeeds in Singapore may lead one to
have better understanding of why and how it fails or succeeds
in other places.
METHOD OF APPROACH
It would be preferrable to have field observation for this
study, to see how the HDB housing projects have reshaped the
island's landscape. But for various reasons, it was difficult
to conduct a study based on field work. The study is, there-
fore, based on available data and published literature.
The data used here were primarily collected from the HDB
annual reports, and census reports of Singapore for 1970 and
1980. The HDB reports provide information about how housing
projects have developed, and its future plans. The census
reports reveal exactly how many people reside in each division
and what types of housing were present in both censuses. By
comparing the population growth in each division and the
percentage of people living in HDB housing, the relationship
between population growth, distribution, and HDB housing deve-
lopment can be analyzed.
Several books dealing exclusively with public housing in
Singapore have been published. The books proved to be helpful
in understanding more about qualitative development in HDB
projects. In addition, a number of sociological surveys have
been completed by HDB researchers and other scholars. These
surveys provide some insights about what impacts the HDB housing
development has brought for the population. Additional insight
was available from a number of related articles, scattered in
journals such as The Journal of Tropical Geography , Royal
Australian Planning Institute Journal , Asian Survey , and so
on.
To further understand Singapore's public housing development,
the Hong Kong experience is briefly touched on in Chapter 2.
Hong Kong was chosen because there are many similarities
between the two city-states. Both have a rather large number
of people living in government housing. But when examined
closely, the experiences are different, and are "successful"
in different ways and degrees.
EXPECTED RESULTS
Public housing development in Singapore is successful
in terms of rehousing people and redistributing the population.
Through HDB housing projects, the population on the island
of Singapore is no longer only concentrated along the Singa-
pore River in the south of the island, but is spreading out
to different parts of the island. The whole island is being
urbanized thel way the government planned. Employment
opportunities are created along with HDB housing development.
Employment centers are no longer confined to the Central Area.
In general, the quality of life has been improved. Such extreme
achievement in public housing development makes the Singapore
experience interesting and unique.
TERMINOLOGY
Before getting into the main text, a few terms used in
the study should "be clarified:
(1) HDB housing: All the housing, unless specified, built
and managed by the Housing and Development Board (HDB)
in Singapore. The term is used interchangably with HDB
flats, government housing, and public housing throughout
the text when Singapore's development is discussed.
However, there were some other types of "public housing"
before 1982. They were either built by the Jurong
Town Corporation ot the Housing and Urban Development
Company. Both are also government agencies. All of
their public housings were transferred to the HDB in
April 1982. HDB now is the only government housing
agency in Singapore
.
(2) HDB estate: An area developed and built by the HDB. The
land-use pattern in an estate usually includes residential,
commercial, industrial, open space, and recreational
uses
.
(3) Involuntary relocated residents: The HDB residents
rehoused in HDB housing because of squatter resettlement,
slum clearance, or affected by other public development
programs. All the families affected by these government
programs have a choice of moving to HDB housing, reset-
tlement areas, or finding their own accommodations.
(*)•) Voluntary relocated residents: Contrary to involuntary
relocated" residents, these are HDB residents who chose
to move to HDB housing without being affected by any
government program.
TEXT ORGANIZATION
This study includes five chapters. Following the
Introduction, Chapter Two is a short literature review of
how housing shortages are generally addressed by governments.
Hong Kong's public housing program is discussed to some extent.
Chapter Three is a description of housing needs in Singapore
before the HDB was established, the latter 's establishment,
organization, and its program development. The fourth chapter
is an analysis of how HDB development affected population
growth patterns, and how HDB residents have responded to their
living environment. The last chapter is a discussion of how
and why public housing succeeded in Singapore, and its impli-
cations for other places or countries.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
A large body of literature has revealed various urban
problems in developing countries. The presence and expansion
of squatter settlements and slum dwelling resulting from rapid
population growth and housing shortages are often mentioned.
The latter is dramatic when raw numbers are reported. According
to a United Nations estimation, 995 million, or one-third of
the population in the developing world could live in cities
in 1980. The number will increase to 2,118 million, or forty-
four percent, by the year 2000, an average 3.8 percent increase
annually. United Nations studies also suggest that 13 dwelling
units per 1000 urban inhabitants would have had to have built
per year to meet housing needs. (Yeh and Laquian 1979) Few
countries could meet this standard. Countries in Asia and
the Pacific region, for example, had managed to meet only
fifteen percent of their housing requirements during the 1970s.
(Yeh and Laquian 1979) Despite the efforts attempted in different
countries, most slum areas continue to be overcrowded and
increasingly deteriorated, and the squatter settlements
continue their disorderly expansion. Failure to meet housing
needs is attributable to lack of funds, lack of capable
administrative and planning personnel, lack of adequate housing
policy, and lack of overall land-use and housing planning.
Approaches for dealing with housing shortages are many.
11
varying from country to country. More common methods employed
include: (l) providing low-cost public housing; (2) upgrading
squatter settlements; and (3) improving site conditions and
public services. Providing low-cost public housing would be
the most direct method to house the urban homeless. Many
countries do have programs to provide low-cost housing for
low- income people. However, for various reasons, most countries
have found that it is difficult to achieve the primary goal
of housing most of the urban homeless. Some countries lack
funds to carry out their programs, or can only accomplish a
fraction of their targets. Some countries with poor planning
either locate the housing far away from employment places, or
build higher quality housing, which is unrealistically expensive
for low-income people. Other problems can be traced to fraga-
mentation of authority, no actual survey or inaccurate estima-
tion of housing needs, and difficulties in acquiring needed
lands. (Yeh and Laquian 1979; Grimes 1976)
An example of an inappropriate public housing program is the
case of the Spang Palay resettlement project in the Philipines.
Forty percent of the resettled people returned to squatter areas
a year and a half later. (Grimes 1976) But there are
exceptions. Among all the developing countries providing
public housing, Singapore and Hong Kong have proved to be
successful, is that the housing need is more or less met. To
a lesser extent, Malaysia and South Korea are housing a
large portion of their urban homeless. (Grimes 1976) While
12
the experience in Singapore is the main theme of this study,
programs in Hong Kong will also be discussed later in this
chapter
.
It has been argued that a squatter-upgrading program is
easier for those countries with a shortage of funds to adopt
to resolve housing shortages. (Grimes 1976) In such a program,
squatter and slum areas are provided with necessary urban
amenities like water, electricity, sewage treatment, and new
roads. While avoiding the high cost of opening up new lands,
and the risk of dislocating low-income people, this approach
allows the poor to have a more desirable set of living conditions.
The Kampong Improvement Program in Jakarta is a successful
case of this kind. The residents were mobilized to improve
infrastructure and existing housing stock. By the late 1970s
one million people had been affected. The program is now being
extended to 1 , ^4-00 villages in rural areas. (Yeh and Laquian 1979)
A program complimentary to squatter-upgrading involves
improvement of sites-and-services like roads, drainage, sewage,
electricity, schools, and health clinics- Individuals can
build their own houses at the sites. The objective of such
programs is to aid families affected by squatter-upgrading
programs. Those uprooted by installation of new facilities
and roads have an opportunity to resettle at a comparable cost.
(Grimes 1976) Earlier versions of such programs were not
effective because the sites were either too far from jobs, or
deficient in services. With help from the World Bank, more
13
sites in or near cities have been opened. Small industries
are encouraged to locate near the new sites. (Laquian 1979)
Both squatter-upgrading and a new sites-and-services
approach provide alternatives to absorb the excess of low-skilled
labor among the squatters and the urban poor. In both programs,
cooperative housing is usually promoted. Community resources
and labor are pooled together to get public loans to construct
houses and to improve community facilities. A new community
is, therefore, often created. (Grimes 1976; Laquian 1979) In
some countries, for example, the Philipines, Malaysia, and
Thailand, such an entity is eventually guided to form a pressure
group, and demonstrate to increase the power of the poor in
local politics. (Laquian 1979)
PUBLIC HOUSING: THE HONG KONG CASE
Before getting into the topic of Singapore's public
housing experience, public housing development at other places
would further prove Singapore's success in both quality and
quantity of its public housing programs. To make a comparison,
the Hong Kong case is chosen. There are many similarities
between the two states, and yet a few differences in some
aspects like their public housing experiences. Both are
city-states in a tropical area. Both have experience with
British dominance, and Hong Kong is still ruled by the British.
Both are overwhelmingly Chinese . Both have a similar rate
of population growth. Both adopted a capitalist philosophy.
They are the more prosperous and advanced states in Asia after
14
Japan. Both economies are heavily dependent upon industrial
development and trading.
In terms of public housing, both are regarded as successful,
with a large percentage of their population living in govern-
ment housing. However, the programs in Singapore are guided
by a comprehensive plan, which is intergrated into its national
development policy. But in Hong Kong, development of programs
is more piece-meal. There, the degree of success is largely
dependent on sufficient funds.
Severe Housing Shortage in Hong Kong:
The total area of Hong Kong, which includes Hong Kong
Island, Kowloon, and the New Territories, covers 1,032 square
kilometers (400 square miles). Given the estimated population
of 5-4 million in 1984, the overall density is 5 i 240 persons
per square kilometer, or 135,000 per square miles. (PRB 1984)
Constrained by the rugged physical conditions and accessibility
to the harbor areas, most people concentrate in the city of
Victoria, the narrow coastal plain on the north of Hong Kong
Island, and Kowloon which is across a strait from Victoria.
In the 1970s, a density level of 75,000 persons per square
kilometer was reported for the urbanized area. There is a
small portion of the population living in sampans and junks.
(Dwyer 1979)
Before the Pacific war, a housing shortage in Hong Kong
was already apparent. In the city areas, typical open- front
15
shophouses prevailed. The front portion of the ground floor
was for business. A kitchen occupies the rear. The second
and third floors were for residential use. To cope with
housing shortages, the residential spaces were divided into
cubicles, one to each family. The intensity of occupance
was related to high population growth, further exacerbated
by historical events. During World War II, ten percent of
the entire housing stock was damaged. Another ten percent
was destroyed. (Dwyer 1979, 159)
Immediately after the War, only 600,000 people remained
in Hong Kong. About one million left during the War, either
voluntarily or involuntarily. Most returned after the War.
The population reached 1.8 million by 1948. In 19^9, with
the communist seizure of China, refugees rushed into Hong Kong.
For a period, as many as 10,000 arrived in Hong Kong each
week. By May 1950, the total population rose to 2.4 million.
(Dwyer 1979, 153-5) Since then, the legal and illegal refugee
waves, fast or slow, have not stopped. It is estimated between
30,000 to 80,000 illegal refugees come annually. (Yeung and
Drakakis-Smith 1982) The influx of refugees in Hong Kong
may be regarded as somewhat like rural-urban migration in
other developing countries.
Many refugees have found places in squatter areas. In
1964, there were 550,000 settled in squatter areas. Some
found places at old shophouses. The already divided shophouses
were further subdivided into sleeping spaces. In extreme
16
cases, sleeping spaces were taken in a shift system by three
families. (Dwyer 1979) The overcrowding was almost unimagin-
able. Some districts in urbanized areas reached 238,000 persons
per square kilometer in 1961. (Yeung and Drakakis-Smith 1982)
Inception and Development of Public Housing in Hong Kong;
Despite the overcrowding, not much was done by the Colonial
Government. There was a government Housing Society to porvide
housing for low-income people in 1951, but it was ineffective.
On Christmas day of 1953, a fire at Shek Kip Mei in Kowloon
left 53,000 people homeless. An ad hoc Resettlement Department
was formed within a few days to take care of the victims of
the fire. Two principles were followed in its program: high-
density building with a standard that ensured low rent, and
less land should be used than for the same number of people
in squatter areas. (Dwyer 1979, 165)
The quality of the resulting resettlement buildings was
very low. H-type blocks with six to eight storys in height
were built. There were only communal washing, cooking, and
toilet facilities at the center of the building on each floor.
On average, a family of five was squeezed in a room of 11 square
meters. The rent was kept at 3 dollars (U. S.) a month for
many years. An important consideration behind the government's
unwillingness to improve or provide better housing was a
belief that when the political turmoil was over, many would
return to China. Only after 1963 were some improvements
,.;
brought to the program. Household living space was expanded
to an average of 3.3 square meters per adult. Children were
counted as half an adult. Kitchens and bathrooms were gradually-
installed in some flats, and balconies were built. By the end
of the 1960s, one million squatters were rehoused in land areas
covering two-fifths of the size they previously occupied.
(Dwyer 1979; Yeung and Drakakis-Smith 1982) People in slum
areas were not included in the resettlement program until 1964.
(Yeung and Drakakis-Smith 1982, 228)
In addition to the Resettlement Department, there were
three other public housing agencies up to 1973; the Housing
Society, the Housing Authority, and the Government Low-Cost
Housing Program. Both the Housing Society and Housing Authority
were to provide housing for low-income, white collar people
with a monthly family income between H. K. 500 to 1,000
dollars. The Low-Cost Housing Program was responsible for
families with monthly incomes below H. K. 500 dollars. The
Low-Cost Housing was less of an independent agency. Its
projects were built by the Public Works Department, and estate
management was in the hands of the Housing Authority. By 1973,
all four agencies, including the Resettlement Department, were
integrated into one body, the Housing Authority, which subse-
quently has been the sole agency in charge of public housing
programs in Hong Kong. (Dwyer 1979; Yeh and Laquian 1979; Yeung
and Drakakis-Smith 1982)
A comprehensive assessment of housing needs in Hong Kong
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was not attempted until the early 1970s. A ten-year housing
program (1973-83) was then outlined. The program's objective
was to provide improved housing for 1.8 million people during
the period. It was estimated that about 24-0,000 dwelling units
needed to be built. For the years of 1974-75, and 1975-76,
the government placed 17.3 and 20.8 percent, respectively, of
its total expenditure on public housing. (Yeh and Laquian 1979,
18) About 1.8 million people, or forty-one percent of the
total population, were living in government housing by 1975-
This was lower than the 2.1 million projected at the beginning of
the decade. Most of these people lived in the resettlement
flats. (Yeung and Drakakis-Smith 1982, 226)
The government housing estates are scattered on the fringe
of cities, except for the older ones built in the 1950s (Map 3),
when lands were made available by squatter fires, or squatter
clearances. (Yeung 1979 i Yeung and Drakakis-Smith 1982) As
the public housing program gradually expanded, new town deve-
lopment was incorporated into the program. The earliest new
towns were Tsuen Wan in the southeast of the New Territories,
and Kwun Tong in south Kowloon. The development of Tsuen Wan
was not planned until its piece-meal urban growth had created
an urgent problem. Originally it was an industrial area.
Housing was not adequately provided. People usually found
shelter in squatter huts. The first long-term development
plan of the town was published in 1961, when Tsuen Wan
already had over a decade of industrial development. According
to the government plan, about a half million people would be
20
accommodated in subsidized housing. (Dwyer 1979, 179-81)
Compared with Tsuen Wan, Kwun Tong was better planned and
developed. Before the city of Kowloon expanded, Kwun Tong was
relatively remote. Because of its closeness to Kowloon, in
195^ the government decided to develop it into an industrial
area. Now it has the biggest industrial concentration in Hong
Kong. Commercial and residential zones are also better developed
than those in Tsuen Wan. (Dwyer 1979) Recently, planned new
town development has been emphasized. New towns planned and
in the process of development are Castle Peak, Sha Tin, Tuen
Mun, and Yuen Long. Each is planned to accommodate one-half
million people in low-cost housing projects. (Dwyer 1979;
Yeung and Drakakis-Smith 1982)
Unlike many other developing countries, land acquisition
for the implementation of its public housing projects is not
a problem. The government of Hong Kong owns the entire land
area. Private interests can only lease lands from the govern-
ment. When leased land is needed for public development, the
government may exchange another piece of land or offer cash
compensation. (Casanova, Tan, Leong, and Soepangkat 1979)
Meanwhile, reclamation projects are carried out to expand the
insufficient land area. By the end of the 1970s, about nineteen
percent of the total land area was reclaimed. The new towns
of Tsuen Wan and Kwun Tong have large reclaimed areas, especially
in Kwun Tong, where the entire industrial zone is reclaimed.
(Yeung and Drakakis-Smith 1982)
21
The relatively successful public housing program in Hong
Kong was not initiated as a welfare program. As noted by
Dwyer in an official statement in 1955:
"What was required was not primarily to improve the living
conditions of that section of the community which happened
to be breaking the law relating to the occupation of Crown
land: the task was to devise a rapid and practical method,
at a cost less than prohibitive, of removing, in the
interests of the whole community, the fire risk and the
threat to public health and public order presented by
the worst squatter areas." (1979, 177)
Because of this attitude, only the families in the programmed
areas can be rehoused. The result is that some very poor
squatters cannot move to more decent housing, and some relatively
well-off squatters have been benefited. Recently, squatter-upgrading
has been applied to improve the remaining squatter settlements.
Many of them are located on steep hillsides. (Yeung and Drakakis-
Smith 1982)
Because of the priority given to the control of land use
and improving the environment, individual well-being is not
of much government concern. Housing quality has been kept at
a minimum. The oldest resettlement blocks, as pointed out
earlier, are only provided with communal cooking and washing
facilities. A family of five adults is accommodated in a simple
concrete cell of 10.8 square meters. (Dwyer 1979, 165 ) Children
under ten years old are counted as half adult. Standards were
not improved until the mid-1960s. As families continue to
expand, the old estates have become so crowded, Yeung and
Drakakis-Smith point out, that in 1975 ^00,000 people lived
in less than the 2.2 square meters allowance. They describe
22
it as "the creation of new slums." (1982) Action to improve
the older estates has been taken, which includes converting
and renovating units, and providing individual facilities as
well. All the new units now are self-contained. Meanwhile
shopping complexes have also been introduced into newer estates.
In more recent years, the Housing Authority has begun to
build flats for sale. Priority is given to the existing tenants
of the Housing Authority, so that their current flats can be
available for poorer families. Currently, about 5,000 to 6,000
units are built each year. More of them are still rented
rather than owned. Despite the massive public housing program,
the housing shortage continues to be a problem in Hong Kong.
The problem comes mainly from middle-income families. Their
income is too high to be eligible for government housing, and
yet private housing is too expensive for them. The income
ceiling for the government housing is $ 325 (U.S.) per
month for a family up to six, and $ ^75 for a family of seven
or more. (Yeung and Drakakis-Smith 1982)
In general, the success of public housing in Hong Kong
is more quantitative than qualitative. After the emergency
housing need was more or less dealt with in the 1950s, poor
quality units were constructed through the 1960s. Employment
opportunities and shopping convenience for the public housing
residents were not considered until the late 1970s. This
indicates that the Colonial Government did not have an overall
plan for its housing development until fairly recently, when
23
the problems of the older estates were becoming apparent. The
government's ad hoc response to the situation is also demonstrated.
With the same attitude, chances for success may be low in other
developing countries. What the Hong Kong Colonial Government
enjoys more than other countries is its economic prosperity.
Large revenues are generated from its economic boom, allowing
the government to place a good share of its expenditures on
public housing. From the beginning of the project until March
1977, about U.S. $ 1,000 million was allocated to public
housing. Another $ 870 million is planned for the period
of 1978-88. (Yeung and Drakakis-Smith 1982)
The future of public housing in Hong Kong is difficult
to predict at present. In May of this year (1984), the Governer
of Hong Kong officially announced that Hong Kong would come
under communist Chinese control in 1997. Moreover, the Chinese
government refused to commit itself not to send troops after
it takes over. Several large firms have already transferred
their investments to other places. Whether the future govern-
ment can continue to generate as large revenues as before would
be the first question. The second question would be whether
the Chinese government would be willing to continue the cons-
truction of public housing for the already much better off
Hong Kong people.
24
Chapter 3
SINGAPORE'S EXPERIENCE
The tiny city-state of Singapore is located at one degree
north of the Equater, and across the narrow strait of Johore
from the Malay Pennisula. At the throat of the Strait of
Malacca, the strategic location provides the state with a
most precious and only important "natural resource". Through
the first half of the century, it had been an important
entreport in the region for over 150 years. Now it has become
a commercial, financial, and industrial center. Its people
enjoy the most prosperous living conditions among its neighbor
countries. Its per capita GNP was U.S. $ 6,515 in 1980,
while some of its neighboring countries like Indonesia were
struggling to survive with per capita GNP below U.S. $ 400
in 1978. (The Statesmans's Year-Book 1981-82)
The state is not only unique in its economic success, but
also in its high level of social and political stability.
National policy usually aims at integrated social and economic
development. The construction of public housing is a strong
case demonstrating such a commitment. As of March of 1983,
seventy-five percent of its people (2.^7 million) were living
in government housing. (HDB 1982/83) Not only did the cons-
truction stimulate the economy, it also became a popular
program. Government policy is well supported. As Yeh stated
in 1973, "Public housing is probably the most visible and
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demonstrative project in the Republic. Its success had
ensured support for many other government policies." (Hassan
1977, 1)
On the day Singapore gained its independence from the
British in 1959. the new government faced various, severe
problems such as a double-digit unemployment rate, an extreme
housing shortage, and rapid population growth. In its first
campaign for Parliament in 1959, the People's Action Party
(PAP) promised to reduce the unemployment rate and provide
adequate housing for those in need. When the PAP government
came into office, creating jobs and providing housing became
its top priorities. (Gamer 1972; Quah 1983)
Lacking natural resource, the new government decided that
rapid industrialization was the quickest way to begin reducing
unemployment. The government began to create a favorable
environment for labor-intensive industries like textiles and
electronics. In 1961 , the Economic Development Board (EDB)
was established. The swamp in the west of the island, Jurong,
was designated for industrial use. A Jurong Town Corporation
(JTC) was formed to develop the area. Together with the
large-scale public housing projects, the unemployment problem
was eased. Full employment was reached in the early 1970s.
In more recent years, the economy has continued to grow at
a rapid pace, but the rate of population growth dropped
drastically. The state has faced a labor shortage. Eleven
percent of its current labor force, or about 100,000 people,
are drawn from Indonesia, Malaysia, and other countries. To
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reduce the reliance on foreign labor, the direction of its
economic development has begun switching to capital-intensive,
high-tech industry in recent years. (L. Lira 1983, 753; T. C.
Ling 1983)
THE HOUSING SITUATION BEFORE I960
The housing shortage in Singapore has a long history.
Beginning with the nature of its population, which was entirely
composed of migrants, housing need had been largely neglected
during its colonial period. Most of the migrants were transients
from China, Malaysia (then Malayan), and India. They came to
the island for economic reasons only. Once they made enough
money, they went back to their home country. Most of them
either could not afford to construct homes, or did not bother
with it. Since the majority of the migrants were single males,
having a space to sleep was all they needed.
When Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles arrived in 1819, he
established a trading station at the mouth of Singapore River.
The area surrounding his station became the major locus of
settlement. Later it grew to be the Central Area, also known
as Chinatown. The buildings in Chinatown were,
"... single-storyed with the front portion of each
building serving as a shop while the back portion was
utilized for storage and as a dormitory for the workers
without families. At that time they were suitable ..."
(T. C. Wang 1975, 2)
With the expansion of trading activity in the second half of
the nineteenth century, more migrants came. Instead of
2?
constructing more houses,
"Partitions were put up in these shophouses to accommodate
new arrivals. As the population continued to increase,
more partitions were put in to subdivide the living space
into small cubles and eventually the entire Central Area
became one of the most crowded slums in the world." (T.
C. Wan 1975, 2-3)
The original one-family buildings soon sheltered an average of
five families or more. Basic amenities like running water and
lighting were lacking, and the crowded condition made it difficult
to maintain a sanitary environment. By 19^7, 680,000 out of
938,000 people, or seventy-two percent of the total population,
lived in the Central Area. In the heart of the Area
density reached as high as 1,000 persons per acre. (L. H. Wang
and T. H. Tan 1981; Neville 1969)
With some fluctuations during recession and war periods,
the migration streams to Singapore did not slow until 1953.
In that year, the Colonial Government posed an "Immigration
Ordinance". Under the Ordinance, migration from China, Malaysia,
and India was restricted. In fact, as early as 1930, an "Im-
migration Restriction Ordinance" put a quota on the largest
migration stream, Chinese male migrants. To balance the uneven
sex ratio of three to one, Chinese females migrants were not
restricted. A total of 190,000 Chinese females were introduced
to the island between 1934- and 1938. (Singapore 1975, 63)
With arrivals of these female migrants, more famlies were
established, and more migrants were settled on the island.
Population growth had been high up to the early 1960s.
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At the beginning of the century, population stood at 228,000.
By 1950, it had grown over one million. Growth before the
World War II was mainly from migration. After the War, natural
increase became more important. The average annual growth
rate was 4.4 percent between 1947 and 195?. Migration counted
for twenty-two percent of the increase. Today, in-migrants
contribute little to the nation's population gorwth. In
fact, between 1970 and 1977, there were over 2,500 net out-
migrants. The rate of natural increase before I960 was above
three percent annually. The success of the national family
planning campaign beginning in the middle of the 1960s, has
brought down the rate of natural increase to 1.8 percent in
1969, and further down ro 1.2 percent in 1980 . (Saw 1980 ; Census
Report 1980) According to the 1980 census, the total population
was 2.41 million. Of this total, 76.9 percent was Chinese.
Malay and Indian groups composed 14.6 and 6.4 percent, respectively.
(Census Report 198O)
THE SINGAPORE IMPROVEMENT TRUST, 1924-59
The first sixty years of rapid population growth during
the century resulted in worsening slum areas and the appearance
of squatter settlements. Slum areas were overcrowded. Squatter
areas were filled with wood, zinc, attap, and other temporary
and semi-temporary housing. Fire, diseases, and other hazards
constantly threatened the areas. Even though a report was
prepared in 1918 by the Housing Commission urging the govern-
ment to take action to deal with the overcrowding and unsanitary
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conditions in the Central Area, the problems were not immedia-
tely dealt with. (I. H. Wang and T. H. Tan 1981; Quah 1983)
In 1924, the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) was
established, and began functioning in 192?. Improving housing
conditions was one of its responsibilities-. Other reponsibi-
lities included constructing new roads, condemning unsanitary
buildings, providing homes for those affected by new road
construction, and openning up back lanes in the slum property.
(T. C. Wan 1975) Even though the housing shortage was severe,
more of SIT's energy was directed to road improvements, openning
up the back lanes, and demolishing unsanitary housing. Very
little effort was invested in large-scale housing construction.
By 1942, only 2,049 houses and 53 shops had been completed.
(T. C. Wan 1975)
In 1948, the Housing Committe submitted another report
observing that a total of 4,336 dwelling units would be needed
by 1950. The SIT was granted more power for its housing projects.
But it only built 2,359 units in the two-year period (1948-1950).
Similarly, a goal of 19,365 units was set for the period 1955-
1959- The SIT only finished 10,978 units. Before the new
government came into office in 1959, the SIT completed a total
of 20,907 housing units, accommodating 8.8 percent of the
population (then 1.6 million) ;( Table I). (Quah 1983; T. C.
Wan 1975 ; L. H. Wang and T. H. Tan 1981)
Though there was a more vigorous effort in the later period
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Table I
THE HDB TARGET, COMPLICATION, AND PERCENTAGE OF
POPULATION ACCOMMODATED, 1960-85
Year Target (-unit) Completion (unit) ?o of Population
Accommodated
SIT 1927-59 ___ 20.907 8.8
HJB 1960-65 51,030
(50.000)
54,430 25
1966-70 62,120
(60.000)
64,114 34.6
1971-75 113,000
(100.000)
113,819 46.8
1976-80 130,000
(105.000)
134,000 67
1981-85 155,000
(100.000)
75
2
(1983)
1. Figures in parentheses are the original targets.
2. Since May 1982, the HDB has taken over the management of
flats formerly managed by the Jurong Town Corperation and
Housing and Urban Development Company.
Source: Compiled from HDB Reports
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of the SIT, its work did not keep up with the kA percent
annual population growth. Before it was dissolved by the new
government, the situation on the island was described as,
"... one quarter of a million people living in badly
degenerated slums and another one-third of a million
people in squatter areas who urgently needed rehousing."
(T. C. Wan 1975)
THE HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
Organization and Functions:
Within a few weeks after the new government came into
office in 1959, the SIT was replaced by a Statutory Board, the
Housing and Development Board (HDB), which was placed under
the Minister for Law and National Development. Originally,
the Board consisted of seven departments: Secretary, Financial,
Statistics and Research, Building, Estates, Urban Renewal, and
Resettlement. It was reorganized in 1973/7^ into three divisions
and one department. Since then, it has expanded through time.
As of March 1983, its organization was as shown in Figure 1.
The Urban Renewal Department was singled out in 197^. It has
become another Statutory Body under the same Ministry.
The functions and duties of the HDB are:
"(1) To prepare and execute proposals, plans, and projects
for:
(a) The erection, conversion, improvement, and exten-
sion of any building for sale, lease, rental,
or other purposes;
(b) The clearance and redevelopment of slum and urban
areas;
(c) The development or redevelopment of areas desi-
gnated by the Minister;
(d) The development of rural or agricultural areas
32
CO
o
to
<
g
mQ
CO\
c\i
o
KJ
3
C
2
<
cq
s
33
for the resettlement of persons displaced by-
operations of the Board or other resettlement
projects approved by the Minister.
(2) To manage all lands, houses, and buildings or other
property vested in or belonging to the Board.
(3) To carry out all investigations and surveys necessary
for the performance of the functions and duties of
the Board.
(^) To provide loans, with approval of the Minister, to
enable persons to purchase and develop land or part
thereof upon a mortgage of such developed land or
part thereof at such interest as may be prescribed.
(5) To do all such other matters and things as are
necessary for the exercise and performance of all
or any of the functions and duties of the Board."
(T. C. Wan 1975, 6-7)
In addition, the minister may assign any other functions to
the Board. It also undertakes activities like land reclamation
and buildings for the government and other Statutory bodies.
Programs and Achievements:
Soon after the HDB was formed and the functions were assigned,
a study of housing needs was conducted. It was estimated that
a total of 150,000 dwelling units were needed for the decade
of I960 to 1970. The number included consideration of new
families and people who would be affected by public development,
urban renewal, and slum clearance. It was expected that private
developers could construct about ii-0,000 units during the period.
The HDB would, therefore, have to build 110,000 units. Two
five-year plans were set up for the decade. The target for
the first five-year plan, 1960-65, was 50,000 units; an
additional 60,000 were projected for the second five-year
plan, 1966-70. Both targets were exceeded (Table 1). By
1970, 3^-6 percent of the total population, 2.07 million, was
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housed in HDB flats.
Within a decade, the urgent housing need was met. But
the HDB had made its projects so popular that the demand for
the flats increased, and is still increasing (Table II). To
meet the demand, the HDB has had to push up the targets for
later years. The targets for the third, fourth, and fifth
five-year plans have been higher than previous periods (Table
I). The speed of construction also increased sharply. For
the year of April 1982 to March 1983 alone, a total of 22,180
units of houses, shops, and industrial premises were completed.
(HDB 1982/83) The number exceeded three decades of accomplish-
ment by the SIT (Table I).
Since the main task of the HDB during the first decade
was to rehouse low- income groups with urgent needs, emphasis
was placed on the construction of one to three-room flats.
Rent was fixed at ten to fifteen percent of family income, from
S $ 20, 3 $ 40, to S $ 60 for one-, two- and three-room flats,
respectively, per month. For those who could not afford the
rent, a government subsidy has been provided. The rent did
not increase until 1979, a ten percent increase. (HDB 1979/80)
As the housing shortage was gradually relieved, the demand
from middle-income groups provoked the government to begin
to construct middle-income housing as well in 1974. Four-
and five-room flats were added to the construction program.
In fact, with the improvement of the living standard, demand
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for larger flats has been much higher since the early 1970s
(Table II). The interest in small flats has gone down so much
that in the year of 1982/83, only 20 units each of one- and
two-room flats were built. (HDB 1982/83) All HDB housing
is in the form of high-rises, seven to eighteen storys high.
(T. C. Ling 1983)
An important factor that makes public housing a popular
project is the government's encouragement of home ownership.
In 1964, a "Home Ownership for the People Scheme" was introduced.
The objective of the Scheme was, and is, to enable lower-income
people to own their homes. It is hoped that by owning their
homes people would take better care of them, and it also makes
management easier. In order to allow more people to own their
homes, the selling price has been purposely kept low, an average
of two to two and a half years of family income. The HDB provides
loans to those who cannot pay out-right. The loans are repayable
over five to twenty years at 6.25 percent interest per annum.
In 1968, the government further announced it would allow people
to apply their Central Provident Fund (CPF, the social security
contribution) as a down payment and for monthly payments. The
number of applicants waiting to buy flats increased dramatically
following the announcement (Figure 2). Since the late 1970s,
well above three-quarters of applicants have wanted to buy flats.
The sharply rising price of private housing also plays
a role in pushing up the demand for public housing. Even
though the price has increased over the years, the selling
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Figure 2
NEW APPLICATIONS TO RENT AND TO PURCHASE HDB PLATS, 1960-1982/83
Applications
2,627
5,926
1.451 1
11,400
1,516
1963 9. 501
7,407
196° 11, =.05
0,7
-.3
1970 1
"
, 24
-",596
1971 10,671
20,505
, ,_,. 11,388
:. .i:..:
1977/74 15,635
45,999
1974/75 1C.48C
16, '368
1975/76 10, '10
15,6""
1976/77 5,?C=
16,498
1?77/7S 9,704
21,870
1978/7= 8,851
29,577
1975/ac 9,0°Q
55,561
1980/81 "..09=
7,924
1931/82 10, "70
;3,252
1932/8" 3,7"1
TO RE
TO PURCHASE
M
M~
''' ''"':
-I
1
!
1
—Thousands
—
1. iione Ownership For The People Schene introduced.
2. Allowed to apply Central Provident ?und fcr hone payments.
~j. HJB chang-ed calender year, fron January-jocesber to April-March,
Tne figures represent a 15 :nonthes period of aonlj.cation.
The sane year, the KJ3 began to construct r.iddle-income houcins-,
DCmCE: E33 Report, 1982/8"
37
price of a HDB flat is, on average, sixty to seventy percent
cheaper than private housing. The prices of HDB flats are
usually below construction cost, and the land cost is not
charged to home buyers. (T. C. Ling 1983, l?2-3) In December
1976, the Prime Minister stressed the goal of home ownership
as, "Each of you can own your home and have your family brought
up in healthy and gracious surroundings." (T. C. Ling 1983 , 172)
By 1983, 65.6 percent of the HDB residents owned their homes,
mostly being three- to five-room flats. (HDB 1982/83) After
June 1981, however, the government decreed that the sale price
of flats would raise an average of thirty-three percent, (seventy-
two to 100 percent in the Central Area). And it is to continue
to increase each year. "The cheap public housing era is over,"
as the Minister of Law and National Development declared. (T.
C. Ling 1983, 173 i Chan 1982) Since prices for private housing
are still higher, and going up much faster, 100-600 percent
increase from 1980 to 1981, the HDB housing will continue to
be in demand. (L. Lim 1983) The evidence for such a judgement
is that the number of applicants in 1981 and 1982 were still
going up (Table II)
.
Another factor that has stimulated demand for HDB flats
is the relaxation of the qualifitions over periods of time.
The monthly income ceiling in the early 1960s was S $ 500 for
one- and two-room flats, S $ 800 for a three-room flat. To
qualify for a flat, a family size of five was also required.
After 1968, the family size requirement was reduced to two.
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Table II
WAITING LIST FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF FLATS, SELECTED YEARS
Year Total 1-room 2-room 3-roora 4-room 5-room
Executive
& HUDC
1972 78,096 12,510 8,398 38,305 13,487 5,396 __
I973/74 1 103,767 9,173 8,729 50,4-00 23,624 9,851 --
197V75 91,901 5,275 7,738 4-6,783 23,316 8,834 —
1979/80 68,681 2,13^ 3,519 24,727 25,^85 10,734- 2,088
1981/82 115,388 4,405 3,94-1 4-4,544- 40,358 16,822 5,308
1982/83 126, 7302 6,2293 7.0073 39,9^5 44,052 19,029 10,468
1 The HDB calender year changed from January-December to April-
March.
2 Figure includes 3,8l8 applications for HUDC housing.
3 The HDB no longer builds one- and two-room flats. Applica
will have to wait for the release of flats from existing
lessees.
Source: Compiled from HDB Annual Reports
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In 1970, the income ceiling was raised to S $ 1,200, and S $ 1,500
for buying a five-room flat. (S. H. K. Yeh 1979) By 1980,
the ceiling was further raised to S $ 2,500 for other types
of flats, and S $ 3,500 for a five-room and other middle-income
housing. (HDB 1980/81)
Since the early 1970s, although the targets of HDB cons-
truction have been set high, the demand has been higher than
expected. The HDB therefore, has had to adjust its targets.
For the third five-year plan (1971-75). for example, the
original target was set at 10,000 units. It was advanced to
113,000 later. For the fourth five-year plan (1976-80), the
target was moved up from 125,000 to 130,000. There is also
a dramatic adjustment for the current fifth five-year plan
(1981-85), from 10,000 to 155,000 (Table I). Each year since
the late 1970s, the government has been placing one-third, or
near one-third, of its annual expenditure on public housing
construction. (HDB 1982/83) As early as 1973, the HDB projects
had already accounted for a ninety-three percent share of the
total construction on the island. (Yeh 1979)
Beginning in 1978, the HDB began demolition/redevelopment
of old estates. A total of eighty-eight blocks comprising
19,400 one-room emergency flats built in the early 1960s are
to be demolished. (HDB 1979/80) Also, many other earlier
built neighborhoods have been adjoined by newer ones, and
have grown to a size of a new town, but without new town
features like town center, sport complex, and other institutional
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facilities. The redevelopment plan is to provide new town
amenities in these "estate conglomerates". (HDB 1979/80) Ur
Employment opportunities were generally absent in these older
estates too. Part of the redevelopment plan is to introduce
commercial and light industrial activities into these older
estates
.
PLANNING GUIDE AND DEVELOPMENT
Master Plan of 1955, (SMP):
As early as 19^7, a housing report from the Housing Committee
had suggested the need for a development plan to deal with housing,
traffic, and other land use problems. A Master Plan was
formulated in 1955, extending to 1972. Official sanction was
given to the Plan in 1958.
The plan strongly adopted some major features of the new
town idea. The major proposals included a green belt around
the Central Area to prevent further expansion, decongestion
of the population in the Central Area by one sixth, and cons-
truction of three self-contained new towns. (Y. M. Yeung 1973;
L. H. Wang and T. H. Tan 1981) But only Queenstown, in the
west of the Central Area, was developed by the SIT. It contained
public housing, schools, factories, and recreational facilities.
The plan was viewed, however, as too conservative and
inflexible by the new government. It did not foresee the
political, social, and economic changes which were to occur
in the future. Instead of coping with economic expansion
and population growth, its strategies were to limit and control
possible changes. As the urban environment continued to dete-
riorate and the economy remained stagnant, the new government
established statutory bodies like the HDB and the EDB to deal
with' problems. Urban and economic development on the island
since then has gradually shifted away from that outlined in
the original Master Plan.
The Concept Plan Of Singapore (SCP):
Dissatisfaction with the earlier "Master Plan" and changing
conditions led to the development of the Concept Plan of Sin-
gapore(SCP). The SCP, also known as the Comprehensive Plan
or the Ring Plan, has become a guide for Singapore's development.
In the early 1960s, when the government decided the old plan
was inadequate for the state's development, with the assistance
from United Nations' experts, a series of studies of its
urban problems were conducted. A long-range
development strategy, the Concept Plan, was introduced in
October 1971. The Plan is designed to accommodate four million
people at a reasonable density, six million at a maximum
density. (T. C. Ling 1983) The projected conditions for 1992
were utilized as guiding points for the Plan. It is constantly
under review and modified as situations change through time.
This makes the Plan flexible and applicable beyond 1992 (Map k)
.
The main features of the Plan are described by Olszewski
and Skeates as:
A. Central Area: More intensive development in the Area.
kZ
Map 4-
MAP SERIES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCEPT PLAN
Areas
nrj Habor and Wharf
O City Center
A. Future urban expansion will be outward frome the
Central Area linking the major industrial centers.
El&xj Corridors
^ High Density Housing
Q Major Urban Centers
Development is along the designed corridors.
High density residential areas will be on one side
of corridors, and the other side is for lower density
residential uses.
'O
—¥ Travel to Work
I I Industrial Centers
O Non-Industrial Centers
Local Employment Centers
C. While a certain portion of people will travel a longer
distance to work at major employment centers, local
employment centers are available at choice. Mostly
will be manufacturing jobs of light and clean incustries.
Urban Centers
Labor Extensive Industries
HI Labor Intensive Industries
D. Seven large districts composed of new towns are proposed.
While the Central Area will remain as a dominant economic
center, new towns will be self-contained for daily needs.
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~ Coastal Recreation
E. Open space and recreational areas are reserved in and
between major urban centers and large housing estates.
— Expressways
Public Transport
EUS High-Density Areas
F. Pan-island expressway and public transportation will be
constructed.
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EM3 SSCP Development Areas
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^"* Expansion Areas
G. The development and expansion beyond 1992.
Source: Compiled from Olszewski and Skeates ,. 1971
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The population is to be increased to 300,000. (The Area
was losing population rapidly when the Plan was prepared.)
Employment is to be increased from 155,000 in the early
1970s, to 360,000 jobs by the year 1992.
B. Southern Belt: A link of east and west with the existing
Central Area. East to Changi, the emphasis is on lower
density residential development. West through Queenstown
to Jurong, the emphasis is on industrial and higher
density residential development. The total population,
not including the Central Area, is to be 2.25 million;
about one million increase from the time the Plan was
prepared. The development of this belt was to be emphasized
before 1982.
C. External Ring: A development around three sides of the
water catchment areas at the center of the island. The
development after 1982 will be more concentrated along
the ring area. There will be five districts, each contains
120,000 to 250,000 people. Commercial, employment,
schools, and other activities are to be provided in each
district. Industrial land will be reserved. Both high
and low residential densities will be developed along
the ring area, and will be served by public transportation
and expressway. The lower residential area will
accommodate future population increase.
D. Island-wide recreational and open space will be provided.
This includes: 1. the construction of a central water-
catchment area with reservoirs, golf courses, parks, zoo
:...=
gardens, and so on; 2. reservation of the coastline
along Johore Strait in the north, and a reclaimed area
along the east coast; 3. protection of some off-shore
islands for future recreational needs. (Olszewski and
Skeates 1971)
While the Concept Plan is mainly for public development,
private development is controlled and guided by a short-term
Statutory Plan. It will ensure that private development is
in agreement with the Concept Plan. The Statutory Plan is
prepared for about five years of development, and is reviewed
every two to three years. (Wardlaw 19?1, V?) Unlike the Master
plan, the Concept Plan does not have official sanction. Legally,
there is only the Master Plan. The implementation of the
Concept Plan is in the name of the Master Plan.
Neighborhood Principle and New Town Concept:
The new town idea, evolved from Ebnezer Howard's Garden
City, was adopted in the Master Plan, as well as the Concept
Elan. Three new town were proposed in the Master Plan: Queens-
town, Toa Payoh, and Jurong. Queenstown was the only one cons-
tructed during the SIT period. Under the development of the
HDB, as of March of 1983, fourteen new towns have been cons-
tructed, or are being constructed. (HDB 1982/83) Each new
town is comprised of several neighborhoods.
The original new town idea has been modified to fit
situations in Singapore. With limited land area and relatively
large population size, the density in new towns suggested by
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Howard is unrealistic for Singapore. The optimal neighborhood
size designed by the HDB is i+,000 to 6,000 dwelling units,
with an average of five to six persons per unit (20,000 to
36,000 people per neighborhood), on a land area of 100 acres.
These figures contrast with Howard's 5,000 people per neighbor-
hood on 1,000 acres. The density in Singapore is forty to
seventy-two times the level proposed in Howard's Garden City.
To accommodate such high density, all the HDB flats are in the
form of high-rises, from seven to eighteen storys.
In Singapore, a neighborhood is planned to be self-
contained for simple daily needs. Each neighborhood is provided
with a neighborhood center which includes a market, shops,
schools, sports and recreational facilities. Ideally, the
center should be within walking distance (360 meters radius)
for all residents. But two centers should be far apart enough
so that the residents in each neighborhood would have no
choice between centers. The desirable interval is about 900
to 1,200 meters. For people living beyond 230 meters, a sub-
neighborhood center would be constructed for minor convenience
shopping and quick-eating places. (Liu 1975)
Lands are reserved for future expansion in each neighbor-
hood. To break socio-economic segregation, sites for middle-
income and private (or upper-income) housing are provided.
Accordingly, since 1978, the precinct concept has been incor-
perated into the HDB town planning. Variation in individual
charateristics of different precincts and new towns is emphasized
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through differences in design, choice of materials, and local
landscapes. (HDB 1979/80)
For each three or more adjoining neighborhoods, a town
center is established at the center of the area. The center
serves as commercial, communal, and transportation focus; shops,
a fresh food market, a hawker center, an emporium, cinemas, a
post office, a library and social function hall are included
as well. Not only are the residents in public housing served
by the center, but also residents in the surrounding areas.
The minimum size-range for a new town is set at 150,000
to 200,000 people (Howard recommended 30,000). Each new town
is connected by the overall transportation network. In more
recently planned new towns, about thirty to forty percent of
the land area is for residential uses. The proportion for
industrial use varies from ten to twenty-five percent. The
rest is for open space, playgrounds, sports complexes, schools,
institutes, and so on. (Liu 1975)
New towns are to be self-contained in services. In terms
of employment, especially in older estates, a large portion
of the residents still need to travel to larger employment
centers like the Central Area to work. However, as the Central
Area is becoming more intensively developed with office buildings,
as cost for land or office floors is getting higher, more firms
will be looking for available spaces in new towns. Gradually,
it is hoped that new towns can be self-contained in employment,
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and thus reduce the traffic congestion in the Central Area.
As of March 1983 , fourteen new towns have been created
(Table III). The development by that time had been heavily
concentrated in the eastern part of the island, which originally
was more densely populated than the west. According to the
Concept Plan, future development will be more concentrated in
the north and the west. More units have been under construction
in these areas since early 1983 (Table III).
LAND ACQUISITION AND RECLAMATION
In the early days, rehousing squatters was the top
priority of the HDB. To minize dislocating of squatters,
buildings were mainly constructed within ten kilometers from
the Central Area. By the early 1970s, available space on the
urban fringe was virtually all consumed. Further development
would have to take place in the inner Central Area, the slum
areas, or further away from the Central Area. The HDB reported
more than 121 hectares of slums and areas occupied by squatters
in the Central Area had been cleared and developed by the
early 1970s. (HDB 1973/7^) However, as the HDB projects
progressed rapidly, a search for land for development shifted
to outer sections of the island.
Since land availability is critical to the HDB ' s vast
development program, the Land Acquisition Act of 1965 was passed
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to empower the HDB to purchase land for "any residential, com-
mercial, or industrial purposes." (Y. M. Yeung 1973) Since
then, the HDB has systematically acquired lands fifteen to
twenty years in advance of planned future development. In the
early 1970s, including the British military bases transferred
to the Singapore government in 1971, the state owned fifty
percent of the land. (Thomson and Wardlaw 1971, 51) This
increased to three-quarters by 1983. (L. Lira 1983) According
to an HDB report, as of March of 1983, 4,000 hectares of land
were available for future development. (HDB 1982/83)
According to the Land Acquisition Act, when a piece of
land is needed for any public development, the government may
compulsorily purchase it at market price. People who have bought
HDB property do not pay for the land cost. Private enterprise,
when participating in the development of the island, are on a
leasehold basis for the lands they occupy. (Thomson and Wardlaw
1971) Thus, the Act ensures that the government can develop
the island as it wishes.
In addition to land acquisition, large reclamation projects
also are carried out by the HDB. So far, most reclaimed and
to-be-reclaimed areas are along the southeast coast. The task
began in 1966. By 1983, 1,450 hectares were reclaimed. (HDB
1982/83) An expressway, East Coast Parkway, has been built
on reclaimed land. The HDB ' s middle-income estates, Marine
Parade, is also being built on the same piece of the reclaimed
land. A large portion of the reclaimed area is planned for
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low-density residential, commercial, industrial, and recreational
uses.
Smaller reclamation projects are being carried out in
other part of the island as well. Forty percent of the four
hundred hectares of land area in the Kallang Basin are reclaimed.
Twenty thousand dwelling units have been built on 100 hectares
of the land in the Basin. The rest of the Basin is largely
reserved for industrial use. In the new town of Clementi,
west of the Central Area, kZ hectares have been reclaimed for
the town's development. (HDB 1975/76) Another 300 hectares
is planned for reclamation on the northeast coast. (HDB 1982/83).
URBAN RENEWAL
In 1962, after his study of urban problems in Singapore,
the United Nations planning consultant, E. Lorange, recommended
that an urban renewal program should be initiated. Later a
team of experts supported by the United Nations arrived to do
a further study on the subject. In their report, they described
areas that urgently needed renewal:
"Most of the buildings in the urban renewal areas date
from the late nineteen century. They have been and are
still used with an intensity never dreamt of at the time
of their construction. The tax structure of Singapore
and the protection of sitting tenants have made rebuilding
unprofitable; rent control has acted as a disincentive
for maintenance and repairs. The street network has
remained unchanged since the early nineteen century and
is unsuited for present needs. There is no rapid transit
system, and peak hour traffic has become a nightmare, ..."
(Abrams, Kobe and Koenigsberger 1963, 17)
Because of the smallness of the area, they recommended, "...
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urban renewal in the center can succeed only if it forms part
of a comprehensive development plan for the whole island."
(Abrams, Kobe and Koenigsberger 1963, 11) The report later
became the basis for formulation of the Concept Plan.
Their report was reviewed by the government. A compre-
hensive urban renewal program was initiated in 1964. The Urban
Renewal Department was placed within the HDB organization in
1966. In order to speed up the implementation of the program,
the department was singled out to become an independent statutory
body, the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), in April 1974.
The designated renewal area covers 1,700 acres, or 1.2
percent of the total land area. To systematically develop the
area, the URA divided it into 19 precincts, two CBDs, and one
civic center. Both precincts on the north and south ends of
the are-a are to be developed first, then effort would shift
toward the center. (Map 6) A mixed land-use approach is
applied. In each precinct, land is zoned for a shopping center,
offices, apartments, recreation, and other uses. About 207
hectares of land are to be reclaimed on the water-front of the
city. At least two-thirds of the reclaimed land will be for
open space, landscaping, and recreational uses. (A. Choe 1975)
The immediate problem faced in implementing an urban
renewal program is slum clearance. It was estimated that for
each slum building demolished, seven households would need to
be rehoused. For this reason, urban renewal was not initiated
until the late 1960s, when the backbone of housing shortage
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was broken by the HDB's projects. All families affected by
slum clearance, as in other public projects, are offered housing
in HDB flats. Compensation for moving and a rent rebate for
three years are granted. The families also can choose to move
to resettlement areas, or find their own accommodation. Affected
shopkeepers have priority in renting the HDB shops. (A. Choe 1975).
In addition to rehousing of the slum poor, the HDB and
the URA together formed a Housing and Urban Development Company
(HUDC) to provide middle-income housing for the higher-income
people in slums and other areas. The income ceiling for this
type was S $ 4-, 000 in 1982. In May 1982, the management of
the HUDC housing was handed over to the HDB. About 2,700 units
had been built. Housing constructed by the Jurong Town Corpo-
ration for industrial workers, 24,000 units, was handed to the
HDB too. The HDB population, therefore, increased from sixty-nine
percent of the total population in 1982 to seventy-five percent
in 1983. Since then, the HDB has become the sole national
housing authority. (HDB 1982/83)
Other than rehousing families and shopkeepers, backyard
industry in slums is provided sites to continue operation
after relocation. For larger ones, sites are found in designated
industrial estates for operators to build their own factories.
Smaller firms are offered a place in the HDB multi-storyed
,
flat factories. (A. Choe 1975) Over 189',000 cases of families,
shops, and industrial firms were resettled by early 1983- Of
them, sixty percent chose HDB accommodations. (HDB 1982/83)
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Another problem encountered in the implementation of the
urban renewal program was the fragmentation of land ownership.
More than half of the land in the deteriorated area was privately
owned. (Choe 1975) In some areas the number involved in ownership
reached as high as 100 persons per hectare. (L. H. Wang and
T. H. Tan 1981) To address this problem, the URA was granted
power to purchase and assemble fragmented properties. For
some larger pieces of land, owners are given three years to
develop parcels according to government guidelines. If owners
fail to do so, the URA may compulsorily acquire them. (L. H.
Wang and T. H. Tan 1981)
The Singapore government takes urban renewal as a social
and economic development program. To generate maximum economic
turnover, private participation is encouraged. In designated
areas, after the sites are cleared, they are tendered to
private developers for planned purposes. For these sites,
planning, infrastructure, and professional expertise are provided
by the government. In response to the program, fifty sites
covering 26.3 hectares were sold to private developers for
hotels, offices, and car parks by the end of the 1960s. Together
they generated an investment of S $ 500 million, and
created 50,000 jobs. (Yeh 1979; HDB 196O-69) The URA began
as a government subsidized agency, gradually became self-
contained, and is now one of the most profitable government
agencies. (L. H. Wang and T. H. Tan 198I; L. Lira 1983)
In general, the urban renewal program has brought about
59
positive consequences such as better utilization of the valuable
land, improvement of public sanitation, reduced social tension,
removal of slums, increased investment, and increased employ-
ment opportunities. However, some unexpected results have
begun to show. First of all, the success of public housing
has caused rapid depopulation in the Central Area. The total
dropped from 360,000 in 195? to 200,000 in 19??. (T. C. Ling
1983) Ironically, the government now has policies to attract
people back to the area. In its fourth five-year plan (1976-80),
the HDB had built 10,000 flats in the area. That compared with
12,500 during the ten-year period from 1965 to 1975. (T. C.
Ling 1983) Another policy is to encourage the building of
commercial and residential floors in the same building at
•smaller sites. At larger sites, commercial and residential
buildings are separated. Traffic-free pedestrian walkways
and open spaces are provided. (L. H. Wang and T. H. Tan 1981)
As a result, population in the Area went up to 228,400 in
1980. (T. C. Ling 1983)
Because of depopulation and an increase in jobs in the
Central Area, more people have to travel to work, which has
intensified the traffic congestion. Enlarged road capacity
also induced more incoming motor trips. An increase in car
ownership further worsened the problem. In 1975, an Area
Licensing Scheme (ALS) was introduced to relieve the traffic
problem. According to the Scheme, from 7:30 to 10:15 AM,
only specially licensed cars can enter the restricted zone.
Exception is given to cars with at least four passangers which
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can enter the zone freely. The restriction does not apply in
evening peak hours because of a policy to revitalize the area's
night life. (! H. Wang and T. H. Tan 1981 s Holland and Watson 1982)
Besides A1S, other means are also taken to deal with the
area's traffic congestion. The bus system has been reorganized
for better service. Planning for mass rapid transit (MRT) began
in late 1982. An expressway network system is also under
construction which will offer quick accessibility to the main
acitivity centers. (HDB 1982/83)
SUMMARY
The housing shortage in Singapore can be traced back as
early as the late nineteen century. The economic expansion
attracted streams of migration from China, Malaysia, and India.
Instead of building new shelters to accommodate newcomers, old
ones were divided, and subdivided. The overcrowding conditions
made the major city area the worst slum in the world.
In the 1920s, the SIT was established to deal with the
housing situation and other urban problems. But because of
the limited power given to the SIT, construction of public
housing could not meet the current housing demand, not to
mention keeping up with the rapid population growth. In 1959,
when the PAP government came into power, the SIT was replaced
by the HDB.
The new government granted the required power and funds
to the HDB to tackle a housing shortage. Intensive and ambitious
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housing programs were formed. The housing shortage was relieved
within a decade. The HDB's program became so successful that
even middle-income group "began to demand it. The HDB started
building middle-income housing in 197^- By early 1983 • seventy-
five percent of the total population was living in the HDB
housing. 1
Also because of the success and the popularity of the
HDB projects, the government has an overall plan to develop
the state through the projects. Currently, the SCP is the
guide for the country's urban and housing development. The
neighborhood principle and new town idea are incorporated in
the SCP. The SCP extends to 1992 and beyond.
Urban renewal was the initial theme of the SCP. The
proposed renewal area, mainly the Central Area, was only a
small portion of the island, but the population was dispro-
portionately high. The construction of large-scale public
housing facilitated movement of people to other parts of the
island. Thus, the URA could redevelop vacant sites. In fact,
the population loss was so great that by the late 1970s, the
government had to have a policy to encourage people to move
back to the Central Area. The government undertook the urban
renewal program, but private participation in redeveloping the
renewal area was encouraged. The active participation of
private developers has generated a large investment and
created many jobs. The program has, therefore, become an
integrated part of the nation's social and economic development
program.
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Chapter k
HDB HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, IMPACTS,
AND POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION
The main theme of this chapter is a comparisons of popu-
lation growth in relation to the HDB housing development from
1970 to 1980. Basically, the unit of the comparison is the
census division. The data have been drawn from census reports
of 1970 and 1980, and HDB annual reports.
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE STUDY
Before getting into the subject, some problems encountered
in this study and the ways they are dealt with should be discussed.
Changes in division boundaries and creation of new divisions,
make comparisom of individual areas difficult, and often impos-
sible or inaccurate. In such case, it often has been necessary
to aggregate 1980 units to agree with 1970 units. Thus, multi-
division units (including several to many 1980 divisions) are
treated as one unit and compared with the same or about the
same area of 1970.
It is clear that most of the census division boundaries
had been changed to some degree from 1970 to 1980. But nowhere
in materials or data gathered for this study were changes
clearly stated. A researcher must overlay census maps of
1970 and 1980 to determine changes. In some cases, the shapes
of some divisions may look the same, but when overlaid, they
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do not exactly match, Paya Lebar and Upper Serangoon are
examples of this kind. When changes were slight, a division
boundary is treated as unchanged. Of course, some of the very
slight changes may be attributed to cartographic practices,
rather than to actual boundary change.
Another difficulty is presented in the units used in HDB
reports. HDB units differ from those used in census reports.
In its reports, the HDB does not provide a definite boundary
for each estate or new town it builds. Apparently it does
not always follow a census boundary. For instance, the division
of Queenstown is a rather small division in both censuses, but
on the HDB map the New Town of Queenstown covers a rather large
area (Map 7, 8, and 10). The population in the New Town of
Queenstown is over k.6 times of that of Queenstown Division
(134, 400 vs. 28,981). A similar situation obtains for
Bedok and Ang Mo Kio new towns. To deal with this problem,
the HDB map is overlaid with the census map to get a rough
estimatation of how the two correspond. When a population
figure is applied, unless stated otherwise, it will be a
number from a census report.
Locations of the HDB estates also cause confusion. The
HDB does not indicate all the names of estates or new towns on
its maps. Luckily, many of the names it uses are the same or
similar to the names of census divisions. It is assumed that
the location of a particular estate is in the division with
the same name. Also^ the census report of the number of people
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living in HDB housing in each division is helpful in deter-
minning locations of estates.
Another point of confusion is related to whether the
administrative city boundary has been changed since the 1960s.
With the construction of HDB housing, the urban areas and the
pattern of population concentration are quite different now
from the situation obtaining when the current government took
office. Most of the references seem to give different definitions
of urban, suburban, and city area. (Neville 1979, 142 ; Ooi 1969,
1; Yeung 1973, ^9) Both census reports of 1970 and 1980 also
gave different boundaries for urban, suburban, and rural areas.
(K. C. Kim 1981 ; Department of Statistics 1973) Of all the
maps collected for this study, only the one provided by Ooi Jin-
Bee, a professor of geography at University of Singapore, in
Modern Singapore clearly indicated the city boundary on the
map was the administrative city boundary. Therefore, the city
boundary on his map is applied to define the administrative
city area (Map 7 and 8).
A similar problem occurs in the Central Area. The 1980
census report did give the divisions that were classified as
the Central Area. But all the given divisions had new boundaries.
The entire area also appeared to be smaller than that shown on the
maps provided by some authors of articles published in various
journals and books. ( Choe 1975. 11^; Teo 1979, 15^; Yeung and
Yeh 1971, 76) All these maps had a somewhat identical boundary
for the Central Area, which is quite different from the boundary
05
ass
i I -3 1H«
-j - i a
U r
- _ w .»*.•* «->^ r-9 £2.^.21 —2 £"£.— S-SS,
= ¥-!»
66
i i
if i*s;SS = Sis I 7J I |«S « =
;5: << i*«««io"j»P=" E 8 at
E £ £ * 3 « » B I* I* fl •• *« P B »• d S3
II::'
>or-OPO-w^r^icf-aoiO- >SlK^^S>rNSS»«^^^avovaSvO
CO
>, a — E O • I — 9« a —a 5 h
I
s
It- Is,
<3<jaa£aoa£aBa£u3u^huou=:-)-ii-iiS
— M ftp W M H
IfffS
-« ^— — — —
-
3
O
ft
o
'X
0»
Q)
o
c
C
CD
o
6?
given in the 1980 census report. In this study, the census
boundary of the Central Area is ignored. Furthermore, instead
of Central Area, some scholars/researchers use the term "Central
City" to refer the same area. To avoid the possible confusion
with the administrative city area, "Central Area" is applied
throughout the text. Finally, it should also be pointed out
that since this study heavily depends on government data and
reports, the conclusion is subject to further verification.
CHANGES OF CENSUS DIVISION BOUNDARIES, 1970-80
For the 1970 census the island was divided into 58
divisions. The city area had 39 divisions, with 19 divisions
for the rest of the country. For the 1980 census the number
was increased to 69 divisions; ^5 in the city, 2k outside of
the city ( Maps 7 and 8). For 1980 census not only had new
divisions been added, but the old boundaries were redrawn..
Also, some divisions were removed. The boundaries of the 1980
census, "... coincided respectively with the corresponding
electoral divisions ... for the 1976 Parliamentary elections."
(Kim 1981, 1)
Most changes in boundaries and creation of new divisions
occured near the Central Area. Some old divisions were merged
with others or redrawn to be new divisions. The 1970 divisions
of Crawford, Sepoy Lines, Bras Basah, Stamford, Kampong Kapor,
Hong Lim were redrawn and renamed in 1980. Buona Vista,
Brickworks, Leng Kee, Radin Mas, Henderson, Kim Seng, and Kolam
Ayer were newly created divisions in the 1980 census. No
08
single division in or near the Central Area retained its old
boundary. Therefore, the measure of the population growth in
this section, including the Central Area, is based on a region
composed of units in and adjacent to the Central Area. For
instance, the division of Telok Ayer and Anson, westward all
the way to Alexandra and Queenstown, a total of 18 divisions,
are treated as one unit in 1980 to compare with a corresponding
area of 17 divisions in 1970. In the middle section of the
city, 12 divisions, from Potong Pasir to Cairnhill in 1980,
are compared with the 13 divisions of 1970 in the same part
of the city. The New Town of Toa Payoh, built in the middle
of the 1960s, was a single division in 1970. For the 1980
census it became five divisions: Kuo Chuan, Khe Bong, Boon Teck,
Kim Keat, and Toa Payoh. The divisions in the eastern section
of the city, generally speaking, maintained original boundaries
( Map 7 and 8 )
.
Outside of the city, changes in division boundaries were
largely related to HDB development. The creation of the New
Town of Bedok in the east changed the boundaries of Kampong
Chai Chee and Siglap. Similarly, Ang Mo Kio New Town in the
north of the city partly reshaped boundaries of Nee Soon and
Thomson. The new division of Braddell Heights was mostly taken
from Serangoon Gardens, and a small part from Thomson. Jurong,
the industrial estate in the west, was split into Jurong and
Boon Lay. Bukit Timah, between Jurong and the city, became
Bukit Timah and Bukit Batok. The southeastern part of Bukit
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Batok was taken from Bukit Panjang. In the northern part of
the island where HDB housing was not emphasized until the 1980s,
the division boundaries remained much the same, such as Chua
Chu Kang and Sembanwang.
IMPACTS OF THE PUBLIC HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
After more than two decades of development, the HDB
housing projects have reshaped the spatial pattern of urban
centers and population distribution in Singapore. Before
independence (1959) and also during the 1960s, the major
urbanized area and the area with highly concentrated population,
were within the administrative city area. The city area covered
37.5 square miles, or a sixteen percent of the total land area.
Sixty-three percent of the total population lived in the city
in 1957, and sixty- two percent in 1970. (Neville 1969 1 56)
Within the administrative city area, the so called Central
Area, the major urban center, was the most crowded. Its 1,700
acres area (1.2 percent of the total) accommodated 360,000
people (twenty-five percent of the total) in 1957- (Neville
1969; T. C. Ling 1983) This area was later designated for
urban renewal
.
As a consequence of the HDB housing projects, not only
has the city population been decentralized but also the
Central Area. By 1980, the city population declined to fifty-
two percent of the total (2.41 million). In the Central Area,
the population declined to a low of 200,000 in 1977, which
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was 8.7 percent of the total (2.31 million). A more recent
policy of bringing back lost population resulted in an increase
to 228,400 in 1980 (9.5 percent of the total). (T. C. Ling 1983)
Meanwhile, several urban centers have been created, also through
the HDB housing development, in different parts of the island.
Such a massive public housing construction not only changed
the overall urban population distribution, but also affected
the pattern of economic growth.
Population Growth and HDB Housing Development, 1957-70:
Since the inception of HDB housing programs in i960 , a
series of initiatives have guided residents in their choice
of where to live. A trend is evident from the 1970 census.
Wherever the large HDB estates located, there would be a sub-
stantial population increase. The census divisions of Queens-
town and MacPherson, for example, had population increase of
1,806 and 1.144 percent, respectively, from 1957 to 1970.
The average national population increase for the same period
was 43.5 percent. In Queenstown, 99-2 percent of the population
was living in HDB housing, while a similar level of ninety-
seven percent was recorded for MacPherson. The ten divisions
with greater increases during the intercensal period all had
a large portion of their people living in HDB housing (Table
IV).
HDB housing construction during the 1960s was mainly within
ten kilometers of the Central Area, an area that did not extend
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Table IV
PERCENT OF POPULATION INCREASE, 1957-70 AND 1970-80; PERCENT
OF POPULATION LIVING IN HDB HOUSING, 1970 AND 1980, BY CENSUS
DIVISION
Population % in HUB Population % in HOB Growth of
Growth, {%, Housing, Growth, (jo) Housing, HUB Population,
Division 1970-80 1980 (1
J
1957-70 1970 (%). 1970-80
Alexandra -56.6 99.6 429 94.3 +5.3
Aljunied "5
;(«} 75
282 65.8 +9.2
Aug Ho Kio 95 —
~(4) —
Anson +25 61.7 -24 +61.7
Bedok * 99.6 — — —
Boon Lay * 85.6 — — —
Boon Teck * 100 — — —
Braddell Heights * (x. .. — — —
Bras Basah **^ J I — -30 —
Brickworks * 96.4 — — —
Bukit Batok * 18 — — —
Bukit Ho Swee -55.9 99.2 137 97.4 +1.8
Bukit Herah -49.6 99.7 194 86.2 +13.5
Bukit Panjang -13.4 35.3 59 +55.5
Bukit Tiaah +104 80.8 87 3.1 +77.7
Buona Vista # 92.4 — — —
Caimhill -8.5 13.5 -9 5.5 +8
Changi -23.9 5 56 +5
Chua Chu Kang -.3 17.5 100 3.2 +14.1
Crawford ** — -23 54.4 —
Delta -42 95.5 24 88.4 +7.1
Parrer Park -4.1 48.3 -12 37.2 +11.1
Geylang 3ast
-45 52 5 +52
Geylang Serai -44 66.9 ~8 +66.9
Geylang /est +47 77.9 -26 5 72.9
Havelock +5.6 78.2 -37 47.4 +30.8
Henderson * 99.9 — — —
Hong Lim tm — -43 10.6 —
Jalan Besar +21.8 46.6 -50 10.4 +36.2
Jalan Kayu +15 37.9 58 +37.9
Joo Chiat -12
. , -5 ,
.
Jurong -3.6 82.3 116 50.6 +51.7
Kallang +.03 81.2 18 75.5 +7.9
Kampong Chai
Chee +67.7 87.5 81 9.4 +78.1
Kampong Glam +101 58.9 -59 a , +58.9
Kampong Kapor ** — -22
.4
Kampong
KemDangan
-53.7 ,
.
83 , , —
Kanpong U3I -28 59.1 63 8.1 +51
Katong
-45 43.8 1 .16 54 -10.2
Khe Bong # 99.9 — — —
Kim Keat # 99.7 — _
Kim 3eng * 99.7 — — —
Kolam Ayer * 99 — — —
ICreta Ayer +40 63.9 -39 16.3 +47.6
Kuo Chuan * 99.1 — — —
on
Table IV (continued)
Population % in HUB Population % in HUB Growth of
Growth, (%') Housing, Growth, {%) Housing, HUB Population,
Jivison 1970-80 1980 1957-70 1970 (%). 1970-80
Leng Kee * 98.5 —
IlacPherson -7 99.8 1,144 97 +2.8
Marine Parade * 100 __ —
Houlnein -21 47.6 -1 16.9 +30.7
i!ountbatten -51 97.8 597 98.2 -.4
Nee Soon -8 22.4 S3 , # + 22.4
Pasix Panjang +8 56.4 12 18.4 +38
Paya Lebar -30 25.7 42 , . +25.7
Potong Pasir
-31 48.7 9 +48.7
Punggol +17 38.5 43 +38.5
Queestown -31 99.6 1,806 99.2 +.4
Hadin Has * 95.4 __
River Valley +15 31.8 +31.8
pLOchore +3 43.7 -12 35 +10.7
Sembanwang +16.5 35 23 . • +35
Sepoy Lines ** — 37 63.8
Serangoon
Gardens +216 80.1 27 ## +80.1
Siglap +6 33.5 34 2.4 +31.1
Stamford «* —
-if • __
Tampines -4 30.2 62
• • +50.2
Yanglin ^3 5.9 25 +5.9
Tanjong Pagar +5 55 -14 19.3 +35.7
Telok Ayer -14 23.9 -31 .1 +23.8
Telok Blangah
-4 97.4 15 , B 97.4
Thomson
-33 24.4 72 • • +24.4
Tiong Bahru
-47 92.7 51 81.2 +11.5
Toa Payoh -78 100 252 87.7 12.3
Ulu Pandan +6 57.7 42 • • +57.7
Upper Serangoon
-47
, , 20
..'hampoa +12 95.8 316 84.5 +11.3
(1)
(2)
(3)
w
Since the HDB has taken over the management of all otherpublic housing built by the JCT and HUDC
, the percentages
are calculated with population living in all types of publichousing. r
* The new divisions of 1980.
** The old divisions of 1970which had been redrawn and renamed
.. No people was living in public housing in the divisions.
Source: Compiled from Census Reports of 1970 and 1980
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beyond the administrative city boundary. Therefore, while the
population in the Central Area declined significantely
, the
city population remained as large as sixty-two percent of the
total population in 1970. Most of the divisions in the Central
Area had a population decrease, from a forty- three percent
decrease in Hong Lim to tweleve percent in Rochore. The
divisions around the Central Area, nevertheless, had a large
gain. Many divisions more than doubled or tripled their popu-
lation. Mountbatten gained nearly 600 percent, Alexandra
kZ9 percent, and Toa Payoh 232 percent. Each of these divisions
had nearly ninety percent or more of their population residing
in HDB flats (Table IV).
Almost every division outside of the city, even those
with less extensive HDB housing construction, gained population
between 1957 and 1970 as well. Jurong, for example, which
has been designated for industrial development, had a 116
percent increase in its population. Some housing was provided
for workers by the Jurong Town Corporation, also a government
agency. Some other divisions gained a much higher percentage
of population than the national average. Much of the change
could be attributed to suburbanization. Bukit Timah and Thomson
for instance, gained eighty-seven and seventy-two percent,
respectively, during the same period, but Bukit Timah had only
three percent of its people living in HDB housing. The gain
in these divisions came mainly through private housing develop-
ment. The population increase in these divisions, however,
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is not as dramatic as those divisions with a high percentage
of HDB population.
Since the 1970s, construction of public housing has spread
to different parts of the island. The HDB has put more effort
into the development outside of the city. A large number of
people moved out to new estates or newly created urban centers
(new towns). As a result, the city population dropped to fifty-
two percent of the total in 1980. The divisions with greater
increase are those outside of the city, either those with large
HDB estates, or the planned new towns.
Population Growth and HDB Housing Development, 1970-80:
Over the decade, 1970 to 1980, Singapore recorded a
population increase of sixteen percent. But the increase was
not evenly distributed. In the city area, a decline of 2.3
percent actually occurred. All the population gain during
the period was, therefore, in areas outside of the city; a k6.S
percent increase. In general, especially outside of the city,
the pattern of population growth followed HDB ' s housing deve-
lopement closely (Maps 9, 10, and 11).
Despite the overall loss in the city, two sections had
a higher percentage increase than the national average, Ulu
Pandan and Toa Payoh. For the 1980 census, the original division
of Ulu Pandan was divided into Ulu Pandan and Buona Vista, with
a large portion in the north being transferred to Tanglin.
Even with the loss of some area to Tanglin (the density of
the lost segment was low ) f ulu pandan and Buona Vista together
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had an eighty-three percent increase over the original Ulu
Pandan Division. Without the population in Buona Vista, the
growth was only six percent for Ulu Pandan. Therefore, most
of the growth occurred in Buona Vista. Over ninety-two percent
of the population in Buona Vista was living in HDB housing in
1980, and 57-7 percent in Ulu Pandan (Table IV). In 1970, no
housing was built in Ulu Pandan Division. The HDB construction
certainly played a most important role in the population growth
in this region (Map 9 and 11),
Toa Payoh, which was divided into five divisions for the 1980
census, had a forty-one percent increase. It was the site for
the second new town constructed in Singapore. There was
already 87.7 percent of the population living in HDB housing
in 1970. The total increased to 99.7 percent in 1980 when all
five divisions are aggregated. The HDB development, again,
caused the rapid population increase in the New Town of Toa
Payoh
.
Two other areas also had population gains, but far below
the national average: the middle section of the city and Pasir
Panjang; seven and eight percent, respectively. Both areas
had a substantial increase in the HDB population, but the
overall population increase was only one half or less than
one half of the national average. For the eleven divisions
in the middle section of the city (12 divisions in the 1970
census) , the slow rate of growth may have been due to urban
renewal programs and clearance of squatters. People in the
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slum and squatter areas were rehoused to other divisions such
as Toa Payoh or Ang Mo Kio. For Pasir Panjang, the population
living in public housing increased over the decade, from
eighteen to fifty-six percent, but the population did not
increase proportionately. The most likely explanation is that
some non-HDB residents had moved to the HDB housing in neighbor-
ing divisions like Buona Vista and Bukit Timah, since both had
a large population as well as HDB population increases.
Overall, the population in the Central Area continued to
decline up to the late 1970s. The census reported a thirty-
four percent decrease from 1970 to 1980. But all the divisions
included in the Central Area had changed boundaries. The area
identified as the Central Area in the 19.80 census report appeared
to be smaller than that appearing in most articles and maps
published in the 1970s. According to T. C. Ling, quoted
in the URA report, the population in the Central Area went
up from the lowest point of 200,000 (8.7 percent of the total)
in 1977 to 228,400 in 1980 (9.5 percent of the total). (1983,
175) The 1980 census reported there were only 149,892 people
in the Area, 6.2 percent of the total population. (K. C. Kim
1981, 3) (Due to boundary changes, the Central Area is not
singled out on the population growth map, Map 9.) There has
been a government policy to bring some people back to the
Central Area. A total of 22,500 units were built by the end
of the 1970s. For this reason, it is likely that the Central
Area has been gaining population in recent years.
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Except for the Ulu Pandan, Toa Payoh, the middle section
of the city, and Pasir Panjang, the rest of the city area had
a population decline during the intercensal period. The heaviest
loss was in the eastern section. Except for MacPherson, which
lost only seven percent, other divisions had declines' ranging
from thirty-one percent in Mountbatten to forty-five percent
in Geylang East. Even though every division in in this section
had a rather high percentage of HDB population, from ^3-8
percent in Kantong to 99.8 percent in MacPherson, the population
declined. It could very well be because of the redevelopment
program for older estates beginning in 1978. The program's
goal is to demolish emergency one-room flats built in the 1960s.
This program has necessitated out-migration for some people.
In the Division of MacPherson, for example, the number of
dwelling units under HDB management in 1979/80 was 12,200.
It was down to 5,875 units in 1982/83- (HDB 1979/80; 1982/83)
Construction of the Marine Parade estate (a middle-income
estate.) and Bedok New Town may have drawn people away from
these divisions in the eastern section of the city, producing
a large population loss in this section (Map 9)
•
The eighteen divisions in the middle-west section of the
city, from River Valley, Queenstown, and Alexandra eastward
to Telok Ayer, had lost a total of nine percent of their popu-
lation of 1970. A substantial majority of the people in
this section were living in HDB housing in both 1970 and 1980.
Except for River Valley and Telok Ayer, all other divisions
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had more than half of their population living in HDB housing. A
few reached nearly 100 percent, such as Queenstown, Alexandra,
and Bukit Ho Swee (Table IV). HDB housing in this section is
among the oldest in the country. The New Town of Queenstown,
which covers parts of several divisions in this section, was
the first new town constructed. There was an extreme population
gain in this area from 1957 to 1970. By 1980, despite the
large percentage of people living in HDB housing, the overall
population declined. Two possible reasons for this decline:
one is the effect of the redevelopment program for the older
estates; second, some squatters have been resettled and rehoused
in HDB housing elsewhere. This section, however, is still
among the more densely populated areas on the island. (K. C.
Kim 1981, Map 2a)
Outside of the city area, there was a k6.5 percent over-
all increase in population. The highest growth area was
Serangoon Gardens. When grouped with Braddell Heights, the
two registered a gain of 290 percent. There was extensive
HDB housing construction in Serangoon Gardens during the 1970s.
Eighty percent of its nearly 90,000 people resided in HDB
flats by 1980, compared with none in 1970. Without the popu-
lation being drawn into Braddell Heights, the population in
Serangoon Gardens alone still had an increase of 216 percent
from 1970 to 1980. Braddell Heights is a new division created
mostly from the original Serangoon Gardens and a small portion
from the division f Thomson. No public housing was constructed
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in Braddell Heights. More than one half of the popualtion was
still living in attap or zinc roofed housing in 1980 . (K. C.
Kim 1981, Table 33) Most of Serangoon Gardens was densely-
populated, while Braddell Heights only had a moderate density
(200 persons and over per hectare vs. 50-99 persons per hectare).
(K. C. Kim 1981, Map 2a)
The relatively lightly populated southwestern portion of
the island is another region experiencing a large population
gain. Bukit Timah, which became Bukit Timah and Bukit Batok
in 1980, gained 165 percent. The southeastern part of Bukit
Batok was taken from Bukit Panjang, but it was so low in density
it should not have much effect on the population gain over the
original Bukit Timah Division. Only eighteen percent of the
population in Bukit Batok was living in HDB housing in 1980.
Bukit Timah, nevertheless, had nearly eighty-one percent of
its population living in HDB housing, an increase from 3.1
percent in 1970. Without counting the people in Bukit Batok,
the increase for Bukit Timah still reached 104- percent.
Construction of HDB housing during the 1970s brought in many
people to the division which caused the large population
increase
.
The industrial area of Jurong, which was split into Jurong
and Boon Lay, had a 110 percent population increase. The
population here was more concentrated in south Boon Lay.
Nearly eighty-four percent of the population in Boon Lay was
living in public housing (originally built and managed by the
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Jurong Town Corporation, and was handed over to the HDB in
April 1982) .
An interesting contrast in the distribution of the popu-
lation in 1970 and 1980 is the divergence between the city area
and other parts of Singapore. While the population in the
city was becoming less concentrated, population outside of
the city was becoming more concentrated as a result of HDB
housing projects. The creation of Bedok and Ang Mo Kio New
Towns had caused many neighboring divisions to experience
negative population growth. For instance, Bedok New Town
which covers a large part of the Division of Kampong Chai Chee,
a amall area of Siglap, and all of Bedok Division, is surrounded
by divisions which experienced population losses. For example,
Kampong UBI and Kampong Kembangan together had a forty-two
percent population losss Paya Debar had the largest decline,
fifty percent; and Changi lost twenty-four percent of its
population (Map 9 and Table IV).
Bedok is a new division created from the pre-existing
Kampong Chai Chee, which also lost a small area to Siglap.
The population of Kampong Chai Chee together with that in Bedok
had a 251 percent increase over the original population of
Kampong Chai Chee in 1970. Considering only Kampong Chai Chee,
the increase was about sixty-eight percent. A total of 99-6
percent of the population in Bedok Division and 87-5 percent
in Kampong Chai Chee (9-^ percent in 1970) were living in HDB
flats by 1980.
^4
Ang Mo Kio New Town, which covers the southern tip of
Nee Soon Division and northern part of Serangoon Gardens, also
drew away people from surrounding areas. Divisions losing
population include: Nee Soon with an eight percent population
decline; Bukit Panjang, -13.4 percent; and Thomson,
-33 percent.
The share of population living in HDB housing ranged from
nearly one-third to one-quarter for the three divisions. Ang
Mo Kio Division, created from Nee Soon and Thomson, had ninety-
three percent of its population living in HDB housing. If
one adds the population in Ang Mo Kio to Nee Soon and Thomson,
the divisions registered a sixty-five percent increase over
their 1970 population.
Only three divisions on the island had a population growth
about the same as the national average. Sembawang grew 16
.
5
percent; Jalan Kayu fifteen percent; and Punggol seventeen
percent. All these divisions are more rural-oriented. The
proportions of the population living in public housing in these
divisions were about or a little over one-half of the national
average in 1980 (sixty-nine percent of the total population).
Of the three divisions, only Sembawang had a large HDB population
increase during the 1970s (thirth-five percent of the population
was living in HDB housing in 1980, and none in 1970). The
largest, planned new town of Woodlands, emcompassing parts of
Sembawang and Bukit Panjang Divisions, is to be developed in
the 1980s. It is reasonable to expect both Sembawang and Bukit
Panjang to show a substantial population increase' by 1990.
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Considering the information highlighted above, it is
clear how the population growth pattern is affected by HDB
housing development in Singapore, as well as how the Concept
Plan is leading housing development. The planned southern
belt (Chapter 3, page k8) is already much developed, especially
the eastern part. Since the direction of the development is
now emphasizing the west side and the ring area around the
water-catchment area in the island's center, the future
population growth can be foreseen to occur largely in the
ring area and the western portion of the island.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF HDB HOUSING
Economic Impacts:
The HDB housing projects have not only redistributed
population and created new urban centers, but have also
promoted economic growth and changed the spatial pattern of
economic activities. The large scale public housing program
began at a time when the unemployment situation was severe
in Singapore. Within less than a decade, the problem was
relieved. Pull employment was achieved in the early 1970s.
The employment situation has remained excellent since, even
during the recent world-wide recession. The contribution of
public housing construction to employment opportunities may
be viewed in two ways: the jobs brought by the construction
itself, and the employment within HDB estates.
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It is estimated that building 10,000 units of public
housing a year would create 15,000 jobs directly and indirectly.
At present, the HDB is building an average of 30,000 units a
year. (T. C. Ling 1983, 169) In 1970, about seven percent
of the labor force, or 4-6,000 people, were working in the
construction sector. In the same year construction contributed
5.4 percent to the gross domestic product and 6.8 percent in
1973. (Hassan 1977, 15; S. H. K. Yeh 1979, 170) The percen-
tage of the labor force in the sector was 6.7 percent in 1980,
and the actual number of workers increased to 72,300. (K. C.
Kim 1981, Table 29) There are many foreign workers in this
sector. (Pang and Khoo 1975) Between 1966 and 1972, HDB
built over eighty-five percent of the dwelling units constructed.
For 1971 and 1972, the share was ninety-three percent. (S. H.
K. Yeh 1979, 170) Since HDB construction has continued to
increase, the share of the labor force in construction can
be assumed to have increased as well.
Within the HDB estates two areas have been providing
employment to the residents and non-residents: industrial
firms and shops and hawker stalls (street vendors originally)
in the commercial center of each estate. The reserved land
for light and clean industries
, such as textile and electronics,
in HDB estates, encourages entrepreneurs to build firms
there. The convenient location attracts semi-skilled and
non-skilled females to take part-time or full-time jobs in
such firms. These firms accounted for twenty- two percent of
8?
the manufacturing labor force in 1972. About 38,900 people
were employed. Of these, 28,600 were females, and 10,300 were
males. (Pang and Khoo 1975. 2^5) Together, they contributed
nine percent of the total manufacturing output. (Hassan 1977, 16)
Two-thirds of these firms, mostly owned by local entrepreneurs,
employed fewer than 100 workers. The others were larger firms
employing nearly 400 workers, and were generally owned by
foreign investors. The HDB estimated in 1972 that by 1975
another 14,900 industrial workers would be needed, but only
12,400 would be available. Of these, fifty-eight percent (7,200)
would be female. (Pang and Khoo 1975. 250) Therefore, a labor
shortage was anticipated. To make up this shortage the Republic
has recruited workers from neighboring countries, and even
gone as far as South Korea and Taiwan for female workers in
recent years
.
Commercial centers in HDB estates are mainly located at
neighborhood or town centers. The original shops and hawker
stalls in squatter or slum areas were relocated to these centers.
About 32,000 people were employed in these shops and hawker
stalls in 1972. Many of them were self-employed. In contrast
to manufacturing workers in HDB estates, more males were working
in these shops and hawker centers than females (20,000 vs.
12,000). (Pang and Khoo 1975)
During the early stage of public housing development
provision of employment opportunities was not a major conside-
ration. (L. H. Wang and T. H. Tan 1981, 233) The main
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economic activity areas were in the Central Area, as a commer-
cial center, and Jurong, the industrial estate. Few jobs
were near or in HDB estates. Most HDB residents had to travel
some distance to work. When the HDB began to reserve industrial
land and build multi-functioned town and neighborhood centers,
jobs were created within or adjacent to the estates. Factories
and commercial activities were no longer confined to the original
two areas as they spread out to other parts of island. However,
the Central Area and Jurong are still the largest employment
centers, and probably will remain so in the future.
In general, shops and hawker stalls in neighborhood or
town centers are expected to satisfy day-to-day needs. A
neighborhood or town center usually includes a market, super-
market, sports centers, theater, bus terminal and some restau-
rants. Postal and banking offices have been added in recent
years. A study done by Y. M. Yeung in the early 1970s indicated
that a majority of people did food shopping within their estates.
But there was a difference between income groups in shopping
for other goods like clothes and shoes. Poorer people were
more likely to fulfill their needs in the estates. Higher-
income people were more likely to travel to the Central Area
for certain goods. (1973) However, at the time when Yeung 's
study was conducted, no HDB housing was built beyond the city
boundary, and existing housing estates were less self-contained.
During the 1970s, a majority of the newer HDB housing was built
in more outlying areas, and was more self-contained. Higher-
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order goods shops began to emerge in the newer urban centers.
The average number of shopping trips to the Central Area by
HDB residents should have decreased in the recent past.
Social Impacts:
The most immediate impact of the large-scale HDB housing
program in Singapore was that the housing shortage was relieved
in a rather short period of time. By imposing an income ceiling
on applicants for HDB housing, it also played a role in redis-
tributing the country's resources. The poor got a chance to
share the nation's wealth through government programs. Hence,
social as well as political tensions were reduced. Other impacts
attributable to the HDB housing program include some success
in encouraging small family size, improving the quality-of-life
of people and breaking down socioeconomic and ethnic segre-
gation.
At the inception of HDB housing development, when the
housing shortage was severe, only families of five people or
more qualified for inclusion. This seemed to encourage larger
family size. The annual population growth rate at that time
was 2.8 percent. (Saw 198O) As a part of a policy to lower
the rapid population growth, the required family size was
reduced to two in 1967- Along with an intensive family plan-
ning campaign, the population growth rate was down to 1.2
percent in 1980.
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Even in earlier days of high in-migration, the nuclear-
family was a norm in Singapore. In 1957. 63.5 percent of the
families were nuclear. The share increased to 71.3 percent
in 1970, and seventy-eight percent in 1980. (K. C. Kim 1981,
10; Census Report 1970) Change in qualification for HDB
housing permitted young couples to choose having only one or
two children, or none at all. The average household size
dropped from 5 • 35 persons in 1970 to 4-. 71 persons in 1980.
(Census Report 1970; K, C. Kim 1981, Table 33) Reducing the
required family size for a HDB flat certainly played an
important role in the drop in family size (the average
was ^.78 persons per household in 1957)-
The most significant impact of the HDB housing program
in Singapore is the improvement in the quality-of-life for
people in general. The improvement may be viewed from two
aspects: the female labor-force participation, and the living
environment. The female labor-force participation brings
extra income to a family, and also affects fertility. The
living environment is improved from many standpoints, notably
better sanitation, and better and larger personal living space.
The female labor-force participation in Singapore has
been increasing! from eighteen percent in 1957 to 25-7 percent
in 1970, to 3^.5 percent in 1980 . (Saw 1980, 182; K. C. Kim
1981, Table 26) From 1970 to 1980, the actual number of
economically active females grew 1.5 times. The increasing
level of active participation of female workers can be expected
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to have improved living standards of families.
Studies done in the past indicated that moving to HDB
housing may have caused some economic hardship for some
families, especially the involuntarily relocated residents.
A study conducted by the HDB in 1972 showed that the average
rent and utility spending for the resettled households in HDB
estates was twice as much as before resettlement. (S. H. K.
Yeh 1975) In Hassan's survey of the same year, more than
fifty percent of the residents experienced a change in household
expenditures. Of these, well above ninety percent experienced
an increase in various living expenses. However, the household
income was slightly higher than before. (Hassan 1977, Bk) A
similar survey was done again the following year (1973). The
average monthly household income increased nearly S $ 130
.
It reached S $ 375 a month, compared with an average of S $ 2^7
before resettlement. (S. H. K. Yeh 1975) Such a big jump in
the average household income may have been largely contributed
by female workers.
There are no statistics to show how much the active female
labor-force participation affects fertility. However, from
the 1980 census report, the average number of persons in each
housing unit tends to be smaller in the HDB flats than the
national average of 5.1^. The divisions with higher percentages
of the people living in HDB housing such as Alexandra, Ang Mo
Kio, Bedok, Marine Parade, Queenstown, and Toa Payoh, had,
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respectively, an average number of persons in each housing unit
of 4.6?, 4.74, 5.02, 4.96, 4-. 88, and 4.82. Other divisions
with lower shares or none at all living in HDB housing, like
Braddell Heights, Chua Chu Kang, and Upper Serangoon, had,
respectively, 6.15, 6.95, and 5-92 persons per housing unit.
(K. C. Kim 1981, Table 42) These figures suggest that fewer
persons in each HDB housing unit may be related to lower
fertility among residents.
Such figures are consistent with the general experiences
in the West and more advanced developing countries: the more
female participation in the labor-force, the more likely
that fertility will be lower. The HDB survey in 1973 showed
that there were fewer young children in HDB housing than the
national average. A little over thirty-three percent of the
HDB population was age 0-14 in 1970, compared with 38.7 percent
for the country in the same year. (S. H. K. Yeh 1979)
Many studies up to now have strongly indicated that HDB
residents were generally satisfied with their new living
conditions and environment. An HDB survey in 1973 showed over
ninety-five percent of the residents thought their living
conditions were either satisfactory or acceptable. The rating
of the quality of children's playground was lower, seventy-
seven percent. A more recent survey, by T, C. Ling in 1980,
also reported a higher score, with ninety-three percent of
the resettled residents indicating satisfaction with the estates
where they lived. (1983, 182) Such high rating of HDB housing
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may be attributable to the carefully planned external environ-
ment, and modern equipment in living facilities.
Even though, because of the high-rise form, density in
HDB estates is higher (projected to be 360 persons per acre)
,
personal living space is larger in HDB flats than other housing.
In some slum areas, average personal living space ranged from
h-.S to 8.? square meters per person. In HDB flats, it ranged
from 9-9 to 20.7 square meters per person. (Liu 1975)
In addition to increases in living space, the facilities
in HDB flats are also much improved when compared with conditions
experienced by the typical residents in their previous homes.
The photoes in Yeh's and Y. M. Yeung ' s books clearly show the
contrast. Kitchens and bathrooms are equipped with modern
and sanitary facilities. A related study conducted by Hassan
in 1972 showed over ninety percent of the residents were satisfied
with water and electricity supply, and nearly eighty-five
percent were satisfied with privacy and ventilation. Living
space received the lowest rating except for rent, seventy-four
percent. Only twenty percent of the sample residents were
satisfied with the price of rent. (Hassan 1977. ^9)
In terms of the external environment, Hassan's study also
reported relatively high satisfaction among HDB residents.
The most satisfactory rating was given to marketing and
shopping facilities, ninety percent. Cleanliness of neighbor-
hood and public security were eighty-seven and eighty-four
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percent, respectively. The least satisfactory rating given
was for the prices of goods, forty-one percent. The next lower
ratings were given for recreational facilities for adults,
fifty-eight percent, and play facilities for children, sixty-
three percent. (Hassan 19??, ^9) A HDB study in 1973 showed
a similar response, but with much higher "satisfied" and
"acceptable" scores on each item in its survey. There was one
very significant response in the HDB survey. Nearly fifty-two
percent agreed that employment opportunity for women was
changed for the better. (S. H. K. Yeh 1979)
The most unique feature of HDB housing in Singapore may
be the breakdown of ethnic and social segregation. Ethnic
and social segregation in Singapore began at the time when
Raffles established the port. In his plan, each ethnic group
was to inhabit a distinct area of the town. (Neville 1969, 52-53)
Even though reality did not exactly reflect his plan, ethnic
groups did form their own communities in most parts of the
island. HDB housing projects provided a chance to integrate
these groups.
In Hassan's study, sixty percent of the sample households
responded that there were more other races in their present
than former neighborhood. (Hassan 1977, 77) T. C. Ling's
study in 1980 also showed fifty-three percent of the HDB
residents had the same response. Ling's study further found
that a majority, eighty-three percent, got along with neighbors
well; only 1.6 percent did not. Malays and Indians had higher
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responses, 90.4 and 89.3 percent, respectively, indicating that
they got along with neighbors. Only 80.4 percent of the Chinese
residents responded in a similar manner. In 1973, a HDB survey
showed eighty-six percent of its residents was Chinese, 8.9
percent was Malays, and 4.2 percent was Indians and Pakistants.
Such ethnic integration is also a reflection of a national
policy which encourages people to identify themselves as
Singaporeans instead of otherwise.
Not only has ethnic integration been promoted through the
HDB projects, socioeconomic integration is incorporated into
the projects as well. In each estate there are blocks for small
flats and large flats. Lands are also reserved for private
housing development. All residents utilize the same neighborhood
center and town center. Moreover, the housing projects have been
used to enhance family ties in recent years. Extended families
have priority to apply for flats next to each other. ( Asianweek
Feb. 10, 1984)
PROBLEMS OF HDB HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
Since the public housing programs are well designed and
there is flexibility to revise projects whenever needed, there
are relatively few problems to be mentioned. A major problem,
especially in more recent years, is the rising prices of HDB
flats. Another problem relates to a policy of building more
larger flats. Gradually, the poor sector of society will not
be able to choose government housing when they have to pay
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for more costly, larger flats. The sharp price increase in
1981, followed by a declaration that the "cheap public housing
era was over" by the Minister for Law and National Development,
has already transferred one Parliament seat to the Worker's
Party. This was a dramatic change. The first time the ruling
party, PAP, did not hold all of the seats in the Parliament
in fifteen years. (T. C. Ling 1983, 173; H. C Chan 1982)
The 1980 census reported there was still fifteen percent
of the population living in attap and zinc-roofed houses
(down from 33-6 percent in 1970). (K. C. Kim 1981, Table 33)
Because of increases in rent and sale prices, many of the lower-
income people may never get a chance to improve their living
conditions by gaining admission to government housing. The
public housing program in Singapore would, therefore, be
drifting away from its original purpose of rehousing the poor.
Other somewhat minor problems include: 1) too much noise;
2) lack of sufficient playgrounds for children; and 3) the
height of flats. In Hassan's study, of all the unsatisfactory
items, noise rated the highest. (Hassan 1977, 59) This is
related to the insufficient amount of playground for children.
Many parents of families living on higher floor felt uneasy
letting children play on the ground floor where they could
not keep their eyes on them. These children, therefore,
played in the hallways, disturbing neighbors with their
noise
.
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Interestingly enough, Ling's study showed 71.6 percent
of the residents had no intention of moving out, and another
16.4 percent would move to other HDB flats. (1983, 179) Both
Ling's and Hassan's studies indicated more residents preferred
low-rise housing. In Hassan's study, the height of flats was
second after noise in characteristics disliked by HDB residents.
(1977. 59) In Ling's study, 37.7 percent preferred high-rise
flats, while ^6.^ percent preferred low-rise; and 15-9 percent
did not mind either type. (1983. 189) Since the population
growth rate seemed very likely to stablize at somewhere around
1.2 percent in the near future, and the population is unlikely
to reach four million as projected in the early 1970s, the HDB
should be able to lower the projected density in its estates
(360 persons per acre), hence lower the height of its buildings
to meet people's preferences.
FUTURE OF HDB HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
In the Concept Plan of Singapore, it was projected that
seventy percent of the population would be living in government
housing by the year 1992. (Campell 1970, 51) Because of the
rapid rate of increase in the HDB population, T. C. Ling
forecast a new figure of eighty to eighty-five percent by 1992.
(1983,177) However, taking over of Jurong Town Corporation's
public housing and HUDC
' s middle-income flats has already raised
the HDB population to seventy-five percent of the national
population in 1982/83. By 1992. the percentage could be even
higher than Ling's prediction.
Based on a medium estimate, a total of 188,000 housing
units would be needed for new households between 1981 and
1990. To meet a backlog and for replacement, another 96,200
units would be required during the same period. (Chander,
Karunanayake, Vera, and Yeh 1979, W) These figures, combined,
project a need for 284,200 dwelling units. Since the HDB has
been providing most of the housing on the island, with a pace
of building nearly 30,000 units a year, the HDB should be able
to meet the housing needs in the future.
Thus far, the HDB development has concentrated more on
the eastern and southern portions of the island, as planned
in the SCP. Development in the future would be directed more
to the western portion of the state, and around the water-
catchment area. Ang Mo Kio New Town is already well developed
on the east side of the water-catchment. Woodlands and Yishan
New Towns in the north of the water-catchment, Bukit Batok,
Jurong East and West New Towns in the west side of the island
are to be emphasized during the 1980s. It is foreseeable that
the island of Singapore will be developed in planned manner
as outlined in the Concept Plan.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF
SINGAPORE'S EXPERIENCE
Summary:
After two decades of development, HDB housing program in
Singapore is not just providing housing units per se to its
residents, but also providing a way of life. The HDB develop-
ment had guided people about choices of where to live, where
to shop, where to work, and where to entertain. It also has
created a certain kind of environment for its residents.
People are living in clean and decent housing. The high-rise
buildings are functionally efficient, esthetically designed.
Through HDB development, population on the island is no
longer clustered in the small section of the Central Area and
its surroundings. Programs were implemented to disperse
population to both the eastern and western sides of the island.
Now development has been added toward the northern part of
the island. Both censuses of 1970 and 1980 clearly showed a
pattern of population growth following closely with HDB housing
development. In divisions with extensive HDB construction
rates of population increase have been much higher than the
national average. In divisions with less or no HDB construction
population gains have been either close or below the national
average; in many cases there was a trend of decline.
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Even though the overall density of the island was as
high as 3,907 persons per square kilometer in 1980, (K. C.
Kim 1981) the more evenly distributed population has reduced
the crowdedness people experienced before. This desirable
change has been enhanced by the increase in personal living
space through vigorous HDB housing development.
Singapore's Unique Features:
In general, public housing development in Singapore is
impressively successful. The population has been more evenly
distributed; a few planned urban centers have been created;
the economy has been stimulated; and people have been enjoying
a better quality of housing. There are many reasons for this
success. The first reason, and also the one most often
mentioned by scholars, is the tough and determined leadership
by a government committed to provide decent housing for its
people. In the early 1960s, when the housing shortage was
severe, the HDB began its program with the building of smaller,
emergency flats. When the housing shortage was no longer a
pressing problem, the HDB began to build larger flats. A "t "the
same time, it began a redevelopment program to demolish the
emergency flats, and rehouse the people from older flats to
better and newer ones. Such an effort demonstrates the govern-
ment's intention. As there was a capacity to provide its
people with better housing, the government did not hesitate
to do so.
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A second reason for Singapore's success is that of careful
planning. The first thing the HDB undertook after it was
established was the estimation of the housing needs for the
decade of the 1960s. This was followed by two five-year plans
to build the required number of needed units. Later, with
the formation of the Concept Plan, the neighborhood principle
and the new town idea were incorporated into the planning
program. The HDB has since evolved more comprehensive land-
use planning for all estates and new towns. Furthermore, the
interior design for flats and the external environment have
been improved over time. Employment opportunities, children's
schooling, shopping needs, and transportation convenience
have been considered when selecting a new location for planned
developments. Such a comprehensive planning approach has
made HDB housing attractive to people and fostered associated
development of economic activities.
Realization by the government that people desire to own
their own homes has no doubt played a key role in the acceptance
of HDB housing. The government first allowed people to purchase
HDB flats in 1964. In 1968 , the government instituted the
Central Provident Fund as a source of money for home payments.
The government also provides loans for people to buy their
flats. All these policies benefit those lower-income people
who would not have been able to own a home if not for these
government policies. By owning their homes, people would take
better care of their properties. Such a positive response
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makes it easier for the HDB to manage its estates. By early
1983, two-thirds of the HDB residents had purchased their
homes
.
Relaxation of an income ceilings, along with building
larger flats, indicates that the government does not intend
to keep HDB housing at a social welfare level. This attitude
can only be welcomed by those with middle income for whom
private housing is too expensive to purchase. The policy
allows as many people to own their homes as possible.
Another action that has been effective is the government's
attitude toward HDB residents. That is, the HDB continues to
be responsible for servicing and maintaining sold and rented
properties. The government or the HDB does not simply put
people in HDB housing then leave them. The HDB regularly paints
the flats it builds every five years. There are servicemen
on call twenty-four hours for an emergency such as a stuck
elevator. Also, older elevators have been replaced by newer
ones. In 1983 a total of thirty-three area offices were located
in different HDB estates. These area offices were established
not only for residents' convenience in paying rent or home
payment, but also were responsible for resolving all types
of problems locally.
Besides all the government housing policies, there are
other factors which have played a role in Singapore's
successful public housing program. First, with the small
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size of the city-state, it has "been relatively easier to have
comprehensive planning than would be the case in a big country.
The small size also allows the country to avoid
troubles with various rural problems. First of all, rural-
urban migration hasn't been causing problem for Singapore's
government. Before Singapore was separated from the Malaysia
Federation in 1965, migration from the Malayan Peninsula was
very much like rural-urban migration in other developing
countries. Since 1965 international migration has been restricted.
The low level of in-migration is balanced by out-migration.
In fact, there was a net out-migration in the mid-70s. Secondly,
without a backward rural area requiring large amount of
government funds, the government has been able to place more
resources into its housing programs on a per capita basis.
The small size of the state also permits a one-tier
government. In Singapore, a government plan does not need
to go through several administrative levels before it can be
implemented. The one-tier government promises efficient
actions in the execution of its policies.
The nature of the population in Singapore is another
advantage the island-state enjoys. Nearly all of the population
is made of migrants. Up to the middle of the century, the
migration streams from China, Malaysia, and India were almost
non-stop. These migrants came to the island for economic
reasons. They lived poorly, cheaply, and uncomfortablely in
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extremely crowded conditions. When given an opportunity to
live in better conditions, they have been appreciative. Also
because of the migrant background, a powerful elite or landlord
class did not form. Once a government policy was introduced,
there was no need to worry that any influential group would
stand in the way.
Finally, the trend toward nuclear family on the island
enhanced the preference for more housing units. Since the
policy was changed so a family of two could apply for a HDB
flat
,
more young couples choose to live apart from their
families. Relatively low prices for HDB flats also helps these
young couples own their new homes. Despite a large price
increase in 1981, there is still a long waiting list for HDB
units. A large portion of the applications on the waiting list
should be young couples, or new families, because most of the
older couples would have moved to HDB flats, if they were
interested in living there.
SINGAPORE CONTRASTED WITH HONG KONG
To better appreciate Singapore's experience, it is instruc-
tive to contrast it with another entity with some similarities.
The case of Hong Kong serves as an example. Compared
with Singapore, Hong Kong does not seem to be as successful
in its public housing development. Hong Kong started its
large-scale public housing construction in the early 1950s,
but it did not become a popular program as in Singapore
Lack of overall planning is probably the main reason. Its
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program centered on the objectives of land-use control and
environmental improvement. Living conditions were not
a government concern. Therefore, the quality of its public
housing was poor, and the Colonial Government did not intend
to improve the conditions until the middle of the 1970s. Even
though there is new town development, it is still a matter of
piece-meal planning instead of comprehensive planning. Despite
availability of a large fund for its public housing development,
without better planning it is unlikely to be as successful as
Singapore
.
Another problem in Hong Kong is the migration of refugees
from Mainland China. This parallels the rural-urban migration
problem in other developing countries. Large number of the
refugees cause the Hong Kong government to fall a little behind
in providing public housing for its people.
So far, the Hong Kong government has focused on building
housing for low- income people. Even though private housing
is too expensive for some middle-income groups, the government
has no plan to provide housing at an affordable price for these
people. A shortage of housing continues to be a problem,
despite the fact that fo-rty-one percent of Hong Kong's people
were living in public housing by 1975-
In area, Hong Kong is nearly twice as large as Singapore.
Hong Kong island and Kowloon are separated by a narrow strait.
The larger size and separated territories may have made it
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more difficult to develop and implement a comprehensive plan.
But if the Hong Kong government was determined to develop the
state in more ideal way, the difficulties should "be manageable
with its available funds, modern technology, and capable
personnel. Hong Kong's technology is ahead in its region, just
as Singapore is in Southeast Asia. If Singapore can, why
cannot Hong Kong succeed?
IMPLICATIONS OF SINGAPORE'S EXPERIENCE
Could Singapore's experience be applied to other countries?
A quick answer is that it probably would be difficult. Few
countries enjoy the advantages Singapore has: a determined
and stable government, small size of the country, largely
spared from rural-urban migration problems, moderate population
growth rate, productive labor-force, rapid economic growth
rate, and high literacy rate. A small country may not have
a determined or capable government. A strong and capable
government may govern a large and poor country. Most common,
especially in developing countries, is a rather weak government
ruling a country with a large percentage of rural population.
Taiwan for example, has been learning the public housing
experience from Singapore, and wishes to apply that experience.
But public housing in Taiwan, particularly in the city of
Taipei, has been regarded as a tumor of the administration.
Lack of planning and incapable personnel are major obstacles.
It seems the government's determination, or strong and
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capable leadership, is most essential in terms of providing
people with decent housing. For a small country, if the
government is willing to solve its housing shortage, the Sin-
gapore experience is a perfect example. In a large country,
if the government has the same willingness, it could implement
its project at a smaller scale such as at a one or two-county
level. With such determination, any problem should be
resolvable sooner or later.
Overall, the Singapore experience does not seem to have
a broad application. However, it does demonstrate that a
public housing program can be both effective and popular. A
well-planned urbanization can be effected when a government
is committed to make it so. It is a lesson for those countries
troubled by their public housing projects, or suffering an urgent
housing shortage.
One point should be made before closing this study. That
is in the past two decades or so, Singapore has become a highly
disciplined society. When the government wished its people i
to follow a certain policy or program, an intensive propaganda
effort ensued. As one author wrote in his recent article
about Singapore, "Singapore citizens have been made to feel
they are on a lifeboat and there is no land in sight." (Lorenz
1982, 14) The government set up rules to follow for almost
every aspect of life, from length of hair of a male to how
many children a couple should/could have; from environmental
maintenance to where people should live. The result may be
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that a society is too well in ordered (or controlled). The
economic prosperity may promises a high living standard, but
some kind of vitality and creativity may be missing. At the
same time, the strict rules are concurrent with an increase
in crime rate, mental disorders, loneliness, and so on. Minor
problems today may gradaully become major social problems.
To some people, the rigidity has created a situation where,
as Kraar put it, "Indeed, the miniscule country seemed to have
everything except a soul." (1980, 29)
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ABSTRACT
In December 1959, Singapore gained its independence from
Britain. The People's Action Party (PAP) won a majority in
the Parliament and became the first, and the only government
so far, for the new state. When the new government came into
office, housing shortages and high unemployment were the more
urgent problems needing to be resolved. The new government
quickly formed the Statutory Bodies of Housing and Development
(HDB) and the Economic Development Board (EDB) to deal with
these problems.
This study focuses on HDB ' s housing program and its
impacts. The relationship between population distribution
and HDB development is particularly examined. The method
applied here is to compare the population growth and the
percentage of people living in HDB housing in each census
division to determine the degree of relationship. The HDB
Annual Reports and census reports of 1970 and 1980 are the
main data resources.
The HDB began its task by estimating housing needs for
the decade of the 1960s. A goal was set to build 110,000
dwelling units within two five-year plans. The target was
exceeded. The backbone of the housing shortage was broken.
Meanwhile, along with the EDB ' s effort, the unemployment rate
was reduced. Full employment was achieved in the early 1970s.
With a decade's effort, the HDB public housing program
won the confidence of the people, and its projects were
increasingly more popular. In 1973, the government announced
that it would construct middle-income housing for those who
could not afford expensive private housing, and whose income
was too high to be eligible for a HDB flat. HDB housing
construction increased substantially. By 198O , four five-year
plans had been completed; the target and the number of units
actually completed in each plan exceeding the previous one.
In early 1983, HDB announced that seventy-five percent of the
nation's population was residing in its housing.
The success of the HDB program has permitted the government
to utilize housing projects to develop the island according
to a master plan. A Concept Plan of Singapore (SCP) was
introduced in 1971. As part of the Plan, several new towns
were to be created on the different parts of the island. Each
new town was to be connected with expressways and public trans-
portation, and industrial lands and a town center are to be
provided. The new towns were to be self-contained for day-to-
day needs except for employment. The major employment centers
remain in the Central Area, the main urban center, and Jurong,
an industrial center. Industrial firms and commercial centers
in HDB estates provide full or part-time job opportunities
for HDB residents, especially females. By early 1983, fourteen
new towns had been constructed.
The HDB housing programs not only brought social and
i i
economic changes in Singapore, but also played a role in
redistributing the population. Before the HDB began its projects,
the population was highly concentrated in the south of the
island, namely the Central Area. After two decades of public
housing development, the population has been dispersed to
different parts of the island. The censuses of 1970 and 1980
clearly indicated that wherever large HDB estates or new town
were located, there were large population increases. Thus the
government's efforts have dramatically transformed the island's
social and economic morphology.
To emphasize Singapore's achievements, Hong Kong's public
housing development was compared. Hong Kong began its public
housing program in the early 1950s, and yet in terms of popularity
and percentage of people it has rehoused, its program is not
comparable with Singapore's. The major reason for this
difference is that there is no comprehensive plan in Hong
Kong. Also the government is not as determined and committed
as Singapore's government in providing its people decent housing.
Singapore has been unusually, and perhaps uniquely,
successful in its public housing program. There are advantages
that Singapore enjoys that have contributed to its success:
strong leadership, a determined government, a properous economy,
the small size of the country, a highly skilled work-force,
and political and social stability. Few countries are fortunate
to share similar conditions. Thus, the applicability of
Singapore's experience is necessarily limited.
